less due to their belief in the truth of the statements of responsible members of their Gove ment, who are or should be thoroug. y informed of the

On July 2nd, on the eve of the arrival of the Canadian Ministers in London, a debate occurred in the House of Lords upon tha Naval position in the Mediterranean, when, speaking officially on behalf of tha Government, Lord Crewa said:—

"So far as our existing position in any part of the world is concerned we are not afraid to declare that we consider the security of the country is achieved."—Times July 3, 1912.

And proceeding to explain the basis of this emphatic declaration, Lord Crewa added:—

"Taking March 31 of this yesr, we find that we have 16 battlesbips and battle cruisers of the Dreadnought type, as against 15 possessed by all the other powers in European waters. Next year we shall have 24 ships of this type as against 21 possessed by all the other naval powers in Europe. These battleships represent a distinct margin over the two-power standard."—Times. July 3, 1912.

Possessing two Dreadnoughts for each and every one owned by all European powers, the Englishman reads with a degree of complacency what he believes to be the exagerated statements of a few uninformed noticians occupying the Opposition benches.

Earl Brassy, who is admittedly informed in regard to Naval matters, followed with a protest against limiting the comparison to battleships, say-

"The cruisers should not be omitted. In all types, and especially the most powerful types, we had an overwhelming preponderance . . The German North Fleet had no ships to set sgainst our armored cruisers . . . If we steadily built the ships we required, alarmists would be silenced and international relations improved."—Times, July 3 1912.

On July 4th, when the Army estimates were under discussion in the House of Commons. Colonal Seely, Secretary for War, discussing the possibility of a foreign invasion of England, referred to the enormously superior naval power of Great Britain, as follows:—

"In the light of soma of tha considerations he had mentioned, the difficulties were likely to be such that a larga forca could not he landed unon these shores unless and until we had lost command of the sea; and ha refused to contemplate the possibility of our losing the command of the sea with the enormously superior power we had and which he thought we must aiways enjoy. Whatever Gov-

ernment was in power, it must be its duty to maintain our command of the sea, seeing it was by that wa lived."—Times, July 5, 1912.

On July 22nd, M.. Churchill, submitted to Parliament tha Government's supplementary naval estimates and gava an exhaustive review of tha naval situation. In reference to tha comparativa strength of the British Navy, he said:—

"I hope I shall not be pressed to enter into any process of comparison of the individual ships and squadrons of this country with those of any foreign power. Such comparisons would be irritating and invidious to others, and it is very likely that by revealing our own views they might prove injurious to us . . I hope it will be sufficient for me to say that the arrangements proposed will, in the opinion of the Admiralty, be adequate for the needs of 1914 and 1915 . . . .

"I am content to say, basing myself as I must do in these matters upon the advica and opinion of the naval authorities on whom the Government rely, that wa consider the arrangements described not only the best possibla in the circumstances but satisfactory in themselves so far as the next two or two and a half years are concerned. The tima has not yet come to provide for the latter part of the financial year 1915-16. . . . . . . . .

"The policy I have submitted to the Committee this afternoon is tha policy of the Admiralty. Which wa ourselves have steadily developed and pursued and in which we have confidence. On behalf of the Admiralty I shall ask for nothing that is not necessary, and I have asked for nothing that I have not got."—Times, July 23, 1912.

In the same debate Mr. Asquith, Prime Minister, stated most emphatically:—

"I deprecate anything in the nature of panic or scare. I do not think there is the least occasion for it, hut it is of the utmost importance that we should ree clearly what is likely to happen, and that we should provide in time for our own part in the discharge of our own resnonsibilities.

There never has been a moment and there is not now when we have not been overwhelmingly superior in naval force against any combination which could reasonably be anticipated. But I entirely scree. We must maintain that position and maintain it to the full." (Cheers).

And then Mr. Asquith proceeded to repudiate most emphatically the suggestion that the Government were cutting their future programme for shipbuilding rather fine. He said:—

"I have maintained the opinion in this House and elsewhere, that it is a very great mistake in such a shifting