

ple things, she apparently learned by the primitive method of the gradual elimination of useless movements after attaining a chance success. This type of learning is the one mainly followed by the less-developed mammals, but in the apes the curve of learning simple things usually shows a sudden descent from the start. One reason for her comparatively slow progress in the experiments with the boxes and the bottles is, I suspect, that in her eagerness to attain the desired end her attention was never strongly directed to the means employed. When we attempt to solve a puzzle we direct our attention to the means we employ and pass judgments upon them, but Lizzie never discovered the value of paying attention to method. Her impulsiveness and activity stood in the way of her attaining any results that required a small amount of deliberation.

The perception of very simple relations usually escaped her. She never clearly perceived that a hook could be unfastened by simply pulling it to one side, that a button would not hold a door closed when turned in a certain position; she probably never became clearly aware that when a bottle was turned upside down its contents would fall out. As we know these things, they involve a certain prevision, or representation to ourselves of how certain things might happen if certain conditions were fulfilled. But this power was but slightly developed in Lizzie's mind. There are more indications of it