

Supply—External Affairs

I also say this, and I think I speak for everyone in this house. The people of Canada will never, under any circumstances, condone these tyrannies and, given any opportunity to see that they are abolished, they will certainly take that opportunity.

Mr. Lusby: Mr. Chairman, the remarks I wish to make are based on a growing conviction that if there is to be any real and enduring peace between the communist and the non-communist blocs, a key factor will have to be the Russian people themselves, as distinct from the government. During the past year we have seen an apparent subsidence of the open tensions between the Soviet union and the west, and of the immediate danger of a major armed conflict. This development, however, has not been accompanied by any lessening in the delicacy and complexity of international problems with which we must cope. On the contrary, I think it can truly be said that never before have those problems been more complicated, more thorny and more baffling than they are today. Never before has it proved more difficult to assess and evaluate them with accuracy, and to decide upon a wise course of action to adopt in relation to them.

Such a situation, Mr. Chairman, lends increasing importance to the role of the Department of External Affairs in the multitudinous functions of our government, and in such times all Canadians may congratulate themselves—and I am sure all thinking Canadians do so—upon the fact that we have at the head of that department, guiding its policies and its administration with a far-seeing eye and strong, experienced hand, such an outstanding statesman as the Secretary of State for External Affairs.

Of him it is no exaggeration to say that his reputation has become world-wide. The neutral nations trust him as they do few other western leaders, and even the communist bloc pays him the tribute of a real, if somewhat grudging, respect. But it is of course in his own country and among our allied democracies that his talents are most widely esteemed and put to effective use. Evidence of this is his appointment by the North Atlantic Council as one of the special committee of three constituted to advise on ways and means of fostering NATO co-operation in non-military fields and developing greater unity within the Atlantic group of nations. In that capacity the minister will have need to exercise all his exceptional abilities to the full. This committee came into being, as I understand it, largely as a result of the emergence on the international scene of one of the most intricate and perplexing problems ever to trouble the dreams

[Mr. Hunter.]

of western statesmen; that is, the far-reaching shift by the U.S.S.R. in the strategy and tactics of its continuing, unrelenting campaign to destroy us.

This shift did not begin within the past year. It probably had its inception soon after the communists realized their inability to achieve their aims in Korea. I do not agree with those who say the shift was completed within the past year, but I think it could be said it was in 1955 that it became clearly patent. Against the former merely military threat, in what now in some respects might almost be called the good old days, our policy was relatively simple, consisting primarily of maintaining our armed strength at an adequate level to discourage or repel attack by any hostile force or forces. It is evident that, as has been said on several occasions this afternoon, for all the apparent lessening of tension on the grand scale, for all the Soviet disclaimers of warlike purpose, for all the conferences on disarmament, we must still base our policies on the premise that the Russian professions of peaceful intent are not to be taken at face value. The military threat still exists and could again at any time become overt. We must, therefore, keep up our guard.

But apart from that, we are now faced with a change in Russian aggressive tactics. Make no mistake; they are still fully aggressive. Now, behind an assumed front of democracy and good will, the U.S.S.R. schemes to weaken and destroy us by economic competition. First, taking in a sense a leaf from our own book, it will strive to outdo us in the matter of economic assistance, promised or actual, to the undeveloped countries of the earth. Coupled with political machinations, subtle or not so subtle, in the Middle East, Asia, Africa and every other area where the prospect of fomenting unrest and even open conflict seems most promising, the Soviet plan, unless it can be effectively checkmated, poses a real and pressing danger that many countries friendly to the west, or at least neutral, may be imperceptibly wooed away from us, perhaps even directly into the hostile camp. I think the process has already shown its sinister possibilities. In fact I believe the present ominous situation at Suez is very much in point. By the sale of arms to Egypt, coupled with what amounted to little more than a vague indication of willingness to extend economic aid to that country, the communist bloc has been instrumental in touching off a chain of events now involving the west in an imbroglio of the first magnitude.

But in the long perspective I think there is an even more alarming threat inherent in the Soviet shift in strategy. The U.S.S.R. is,