

(h) noted the statement by Mr. Luns in connection with the site of the Council and also the statement of the French Foreign Minister on this subject.

4. With regard to the procedures for negotiation, ministers agreed that:

(a) the questions which need to be settled jointly between the allies as a consequence of French communications will in the first instance be discussed in the Council in permanent session;

(b) prominent among these questions are the tasks and missions of French forces in Germany, including their co-operation with NATO forces and command arrangements;

(c) other questions such as French participation in NADGE and NATO infrastructure projects will be discussed in the same way;

(d) the Council in permanent session may, of course, make any arrangements it wishes for discussion of these questions. It may, for example, decide to set up smaller groups to deal with some or all of the questions. When the political problems have been discussed and sufficient agreement reached on them, the elaboration of the necessary military arrangements will be referred to discussions between the French High Command and SACEUR;

(e) if the Council in permanent session can make no progress, discussion will be resumed at ministerial level.

5. In reviewing the international situation, ministers discussed the relations of their countries with the Soviet Union and the East European countries.

6. In view of the basic aims of the Soviet Union, the level of its armed forces, and its continuing allocation of a high proportion of economic and technological resources for military purposes, the ministers concluded that it is imperative for the West to maintain adequate forces for deterrence and defence.

7. Ministers had an extended discussion about the main problems affecting European security. They reaffirmed the terms of their declaration of December 16, 1958, with regard to Berlin. They regretted the absence of progress on the important question of German reunification and the continued attempts to discredit the Federal Republic of Germany. Taking note of the positive initiative taken by the German Government in their note of March 25, 1966, ministers reaffirmed that the solution of the German problem is one of the central issues in East-West relations, and they agreed on the necessity of a continued and unremitting search for a peaceful solution that would give satisfaction to the German people's fundamental right to reunification.

8. The defensive nature of the North Atlantic Treaty is indisputable. It is clearly stated in the undertaking by the signatories to uphold the principles of the United Nations Charter by refraining from the use of force to settle international disputes. Furthermore, the defensive character of the alliance has been repeatedly proved by the restraint and moderation shown by its members in the last 17 years, even when confronted by provocation and hostile actions affecting