

The radio norms point may require some explanation. Argentina had its own radio procedure resulting from a long naval tradition as well as long-term cooperation with the United States and other Western hemisphere navies in such exercises as the annual *Unitas* series as well as joint operations around Cuba in 1962 and the Dominican Republic in 1965. The Royal Navy in general employed NATO standardized radio procedure with the nuances one might expect from an institution of its history and traditions. Thus not only did the two sides have to deal with the language issue but also with different procedures as to naval communications in general. The new arrangement helped to ease this difficulty.

Reciprocal visits to installations and naval vessels had been important elements in other confidence building accords in other parts of the world and was well known to the Argentines through their own bilateral nuclear accords with the Brazilians, the wider terms of some of the Ayacucho agreements, and other regional contexts. The British knew them well from recent moves within the CSCE in Europe. Here again there was interest in creating a generally favourable climate for building confidence as well as a specific desire to reduce fear of surprise attack as well as unfortunate incidents getting out of control.

Confusion which might arise out of the plethora of accords reached was now to be addressed through the annual review of agreements made in the bilateral working group. Such confusion as might occur naturally in such circumstances could thus be worked out jointly once a year in a pre-agreed format.

Outside the communications and visits spheres, the September 1991 accords also provided new muscle for military notification arrangements between London and Buenos Aires. It was now decided to:

- notify all deployments of major naval units, and
- notify all exercises and activities covered by such accords in writing and not just by voice communication.

On air navigation security matters, and in the search and rescue field as well, it was agreed that:

- one would accept emergency landings in alternative airports to those pre-designated;
- both sides would exchange information on their airports in the region; and
- the UK would provide Argentina with the necessary information to permit it to provide alert, search and rescue, and other services in its zones of control in the region, as well as meteorological information of importance to air traffic there.