

matter. Insofar as location is concerned, these countries are small and, while travel is not necessarily easy, troop convoys have been known to move relatively large distances in short periods of time. To verify that troops actually remained in the locations announced, observers would need to be present and have the mobility to visit at least some of the areas within the exercise zone at all times. This same mission presence would be required to ensure that the size of the exercise remained as announced. Here as well mobility for the observers would be vital.

Most difficult would be verifying the type of manoeuvre. While specific objectives set for achievement by national headquarters should not be difficult to check, the purpose of the manoeuvre, especially insofar as the "intimidation" provisions of some texts produced thus far are concerned, could give rise to dispute. Without United States acceptance of a possible accord, "international manoeuvre" provisions could be particularly fraught with difficulties. In this sense, these matters relate as much to political as to military verification and would require a delicate sense of judgement where intentions and likely complaints are concerned. It is conceivable that, as with the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE) and the Conference on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe (CCSBMDE), there could be another system established which would not necessarily be such a large burden for the observer on peacekeeping force. This might be done through the issuance of invitations, by the country holding the manoeuvres to those potentially threatened by them, for national observer teams to be sent rather than extra-regional ones. This initiative does not preclude a challenge arrangement with which the extra-regional observer system could respond.

Inspection of sensitive areas, while perhaps straightforward, will require resources. With the large areas involved, with long coasts and wide air spaces, and with many borders and special sectors to deal with, verification teams will need personnel, mobility and as much technologically advanced equipment as can be made available in order to cut down the strain on human resources. As has been seen in the recent United States investigations of drug trafficking in Central America, local officers can have extraordinary degrees of independence and control in areas off the beaten track and far from the capital. The past record of Honduran and other countries' officers allowing illegal activities in their areas of control leads to a high degree of suspicion as to the reliability of even national armed forces' reports on activities throughout the national territory. Even the most sophisticated observer or peacekeeping force will not be able to equal the cohesion of national military systems. Yet these areas are "sensitive" for a reason and it is vital that their inspection take place in the context of the whole peace process as well as of specific provisions of the eventual text of an accord. The list of reasons for which they will be inspecting would be almost as long as the list of security provisions in a peace accord.

The possible establishment of de-militarized zones will require a phased approach. A peacekeeping force would perhaps be required at first and an observer mission later for this undertaking. Particularly on the Honduran border with Nicaragua but also within some countries where insurrections are occurring,