

In La Presse, Roger Champoux (23-2-66) was of the opinion that de Gaulle's press conference in February, 1966 was "sur le ton modéré," and implicitly agreed "des accords bilatéraux devraient correspondre mieux aux exigences nationales françaises." Guy Cormier (14-3-66) felt "la décision française relève d'un pari sur la paix. En ce sens, elle projette un espoir. L'espoir que le stalinisme, qui a rendu nécessaire la création de l'OTAN ne puisse plus jamais ressusciter." Despite M. Cormier's opinion that there was no real threat from the U.S.S.R., he said Canada would not side with France on this issue. (24-2-66). Jean-Marc Léger in Le Devoir saw the crisis in terms of conflicting strategies, and the main point was whether bi-lateral as well as multi-lateral agreements could be used within the alliance. He did not see why both could not be employed. "Puisque s'affrontent deux conceptions inconciliables de l'OTAN, ce serait sans doute là la moins mauvaise solution et qui, après tout, sauverait l'essentiel." (10-3-66).

While none of the four above papers explicitly rejected the alliance, l'Action Catholique asked why Canada did not borrow "une page au président de Gaulle." "L'alliance avait été conçue structurée selon un contexte à la fois politique et stratégique qui est tout simplement dépassé." (23-2-66). On this point l'Action Catholique was agreeing with the Montreal Star. Therefore, both English and French press attitudes on the question of France's withdrawal ran from support to rejection of the Government's policy on this issue. But what of the issues classified as manifest and specific?

For issues in this category any decision by the Government would have direct repercussions on the Canadian military establishment, and this is one of the essential distinctions between issues which are manifest and those which are latent. Once there is a question of either increasing or decreasing the Canadian force level the issue becomes considerably more explicit, but this does not mean that attitudes are no longer shaped by latent factors. In some respects the two issues in this category are most indicative of support for NATO since it involves an actual military contribution instead of a diplomatic or political contribution. Whether or not this generalization is accepted, there is no doubt that support for Canadian military contributions to NATO is the lowest (52% - table No. 11) issues 5 and 6 (14/27) of the three types of issues.

In many ways the Government's attitude toward a NATO nuclear force is a meaningless indicator of support when compared with the other issues. While 55% of the press in table No. 11 supported the Government, neither the Conservative nor the Liberal administrations took a strong stand on this issue. For the Conservatives the Norstad proposal was a non-proposal, and the Liberals were equally evasive in taking a determined stand one way or the other (See Appendix No. 1). The pattern of behaviour on this issue was very logical in terms of the domestic crisis over nuclear weapons, and consequently the idea of an MLF was allowed to die a natural death. The majority of the press was quite agreeable to this solution.

The Toronto Telegram was the only paper in table No. 9 which indicated any real support for the nuclear force concept. The Telegram felt the Norstad proposal deserved the support of Canada since it would make it "unnecessary for a dozen or so countries to obtain their own" nuclear weapons.