

I can only conclude that Professor Kyba believes that such experts would necessarily do a better job if they carried an international hat rather than a national one. Although I have myself worked internationally for over 20 years and believe most strongly in international co-operation, I think this assumption is not quite valid. I am convinced that extremely competent studies are carried out by international environmental directorates, but I am also convinced that, regrettably, they too often remain theoretical studies, with no practical follow-up, for a number of reasons, the main one being that the countries concerned with these problems are in practice not sufficiently involved and the studies therefore often fail to take into account various national, regional and local considerations.

By letting the countries themselves choose the problem areas to be studied and allocate the resources required, one can be fairly sure that the studies will be realistic and pragmatic, and include specific aims for practical measures. Since such measures will eventually have to be implemented at the national, regional and local levels, it is essential that the experts who conduct a study are fully aware of and ensure that the relevant considerations at all levels in member countries are taken into account from the outset. I believe this is a prerequisite for arriving at action recommendations that are likely to be implemented by governments and not to remain only a nice piece of research in filing cabinets.

The basis for Professor Kyba's contention that CCMS cannot be very important to any member of the Alliance is that "none of the most important international environmental problems of concern to the members of the Alliance *can be solved* within the confines of NATO". His assumption must be, therefore, that such problems can be *solved* within the confines of international organizations, an assumption I find so completely lacking in realism as to be absurd. In fact, no international environmental organization can hope to do more than *contribute* to reversing trends and to making problems "tolerable".

To take a specific example, the total emission of sulphur dioxide in Europe was estimated to be 60 million tons in 1973 (figures from OECD and ECE), while the upper limit of "tolerable" emissions may be set at 25 million tons. There are technical solutions available to reduce SO<sub>2</sub> emission. However, a reduction from 60 million tons to 25 million tons a year by desulphurization would cost U.S. \$8,750 million annually (Ambio No. 5-6 1976). By reducing SO<sub>2</sub> to that level, the problem has, of course, not been solved but only made "tolerable", and, when one considers the economic implications, it seems evident that it is completely unrealistic to talk in terms of international organizations *solving* such problems.

I would not dare claim that CCMS can *solve* the problem of air pollution, but I think that the Committee can take considerable satisfaction in the fact that their air-pollution study undoubtedly has *contributed* to international efforts in this area, through three and a half years of intensive exchange of technological information, involving the participation of some 250 scientists representing over 100 governmental agencies and research institutes, and finally the adoption by NATO member governments of 15 action recommendations.

I shall now deal with some of Professor Kyba's specific misgivings, or rather misconceptions, about the Committee's work.

First, he maintains that the CCMS has no work program of its own. This is completely meaningless and Professor Kyba, in fact, correctly lists the Committee's very extensive past and current work program under his section on the CCMS pilot studies. The NATO member governments have taken a particularly active interest in the CCMS work program, as every subject to be included must be approved by the North Atlantic Council itself. Professor Kyba's statement seems to be based on a fundamental misunderstanding of the NATO Council committee system, since he seems to believe that a committee has an independent existence outside its national representatives, while in fact a committee only exists as a function of these representatives.

This strange conception of the Committee is further illustrated when he says that the Committee cannot institute changes to its operating procedures on its own and "none of its members is willing to take up the cudgels on its behalf" [*sic*], as if the individual members were something entirely separate from the Committee itself, while they, in fact, *are* the Committee. The truth is that the Committee can at any time change its operating procedures, although such changes will normally have to be approved by the North Atlantic Council.

As for the direction and coherence of the work done under the Committee's auspices, of which Professor Kyba finds a total lack, this is ensured by the countries that take the responsibility for this individually as pilots and collectively at Committee level, as well as by the acting Chairman, NATO's Assistant Secretary-General for Scientific and Environmental Affairs, and the International Secretariat.

Furthermore, Professor Kyba gives a strange and entirely incorrect picture of Committee's plenary sessions, which are, in fact, on each occasion based on a detailed