

placement program has had the effect of making the strategic ASW (anti-submarine warfare) function in the Northwest quadrant of the Atlantic less important. As a result, except to meet the fear that the Soviets would deploy the *Yankee* as part of a first strike, the maintenance of a Canadian strategic ASW function in the Northwest quadrant makes little sense. The relevance of the sophisticated anti-submarine electronic equipment to be carried on the *Aurora* is called in question, as are the reasons for the acquisition of the *Aurora*.

Expensive influence

Canada is attempting to buy influence through its purchase of these aircraft, and the influence is inordinately expensive. If the purchase is to ensure the continuing flow of intelligence between Ottawa and Halifax, then this also represents an expensive means of doing so, and is a poor reason for maintaining this capability. A serious Canadian strategic weakness was compromised by Canada's understandable refusal to buy anti-submarine submarines, the most effective means of countering SSBNs. The *Aurora* represents an expensive second-best solution to a dubious mission. In view of the tasks that will need to be undertaken, a better "mix" of aircraft would have been obtained for not much more than the total cost of the *Aurora*.

This is not to deny a need for the reinforcement of the PA, but rather to question the reasons for the acquisition of this particular model, and the fact that the electronics package has an unnecessary element of "me-too" about it. A European version (and cheaper), plus a Dash 7, would have produced a more desirable "mix". The point is that it would also present the opportunity of keeping the de Havilland production-line fully occupied for some time.

A replacement for the CF-104 will be required soon. No doubt the contenders are being lined up as *Starfighter* replacements with the air element in Europe. Similar questions arise. Does Canada really need something as sophisticated as the *Eagle* or the *Tornado*? These provide, along with the *Leopard*, examples of very expensive weapons-systems. Would not the amount of money required to procure these aircraft be better used to obtain something that answered Canada's needs rather than something that represented the current state of the art in fighters? It is too late to try to match the procurement needs of Canadian security in the domestic environment with the needs of the NATO commitment but in a different

form? This, admittedly, would require modification of Canada's role in the Alliance in order, as far as possible, to reconcile the roles and permit the procurement of weapons suitable for both national and international security purposes.

As the Third Option has featured a diplomatic offensive designed to accomplish certain economic goals, could not Canada have injected some military considerations into the negotiations? At the moment, the Third Option has resulted in an unimaginative return of emphasis in Canadian defence policy to the central front of NATO. The re-emphasis is an implicit acceptance of the notion that the principal danger to our security lies in that theatre, and in purely military form. There are ample indications that the dangers posed are not exclusively military and not exclusively confined to the central front in Europe. Instead of trying to find an alternative to improving the quality and increasing the quantity of Canadian forces in Europe, as demanded by the Europeans, the Government has apparently submitted meekly to the idea of acquiring tanks, LRPAs and advanced fighters as the price of being granted a contractual link with the Europe of The Nine, the benefits of which are not yet known. Of greater concern is the fact that these procurement decisions represent quite considerable "sunk" costs, and this alone makes it unlikely that Canadian defence policy will change, or be able to change, its focus for many years to come.

Hence, what in 1971 had the appearance of making Canadian defence policy more relevant to Canada as well as to NATO now has the forlorn and unfortunate look of an aberration, one belonging to (in foreign affairs) the nationalistic interregnum that was the first Trudeau Government. The promise of a change of direction has not been realized. Canadian defence policy is essentially back where it was before 1968. Policy is moulded not so much by the need to protect the country's natural resources and reinforce its jurisdictional claims as by the need to develop an economic relation with a group of states that are in a position to make certain demands, not the least of which is a re-emphasis of the Canadian commitment to come to Europe's aid in the event of war. The manifestation of solidarity required is the physical presence of the Canadian Armed Forces — not armed with their 32 *Centurions* and similar antiquated curiosities but with all sorts of sophisticated weapons reflecting the present state of the art.

*Procurement
decisions
fixes policy
for many years*