oners of war at Detroit. General Van Rensellaer appeared at Queenston with 2,000 men, but only to surrender at least 900 of them. General Smyth landed 3,000 men at Fort Erie, but was at once driven back. General Pike brought 2,500 men as far as Little York, where he and 200 of them were blown into the air by an explosion at the Old Fort. General Winchester led 1,000 men to Frenchtown, near Detroit, but their end was capture. General Dearborne, with 3,000 men, was defeated at Stony Creek. General Harrison, with 2,500 men, was beaten at Fort Meigs. General Wilkinson, with 3,000 men, was utterly routed at Chrysler's Farm. General Hampden set out with a grand army of 8,000 men to capture Montreal, but he suffered an ignominious defeat from a handful of Canadian militia under De Salaberry. General McClure succeeded in taking Niagara, but Hampden's defeat caused him to retire. General Brown crossed at Black Creek, with 5,000 men, but after the experience of Lundy's Lane and Fort Erie, deemed it prudent to withdraw. At no point along the frontier did the invaders gain any important advantage, and when the war ended, Canada had not lost one inch of territory.

These are merely historical facts, but it is just as well to keep them at our fingers' end, for they are not unpleasant to reflect upon. Were we disposed to vaunt ourselves, we might come down to more modern times, and ask: Was there a display of timidity in the Trent affair? Did Canadians hold back when the sanctity of our common flag was violated? Were reasons for neutrality in the impending struggle searched out with eagerness? Or did our people sigh over their little hoards of money—the fruit of years of hard work—or look with fainting heart at the scarce-born evidences of substantial progress that surrounded them? Like the everlasting fire on the altar,