

this table, to find solutions to the problems of how to begin disarmament. We recognize the constructive part often played by the representatives of Poland in disarmament discussions. We do find objections to the Polish "freeze" proposal, of which we shall be informing the Polish Government in our reply. However, I should like to say that some elements of that proposal are worthy of further study in this Committee with a view to finding a combination of measures preliminary to disarmament which would be acceptable to both sides as mutually advantageous.

There are other proposals submitted by the Soviet Union and the United States which, if adopted, could have an immediate effect in reducing the dangers created by the enormous aggregations of nuclear-bombing aircraft and nuclear-headed rockets. Last week the representative of the United States presented in some detail, as the Committee knows, the proposal of his country for beginning the destruction of certain types of bombing aircraft now. There is also before the Conference a counter-proposal by the Soviet Union for the destruction of all bombers. My Government warmly welcomes that offer by both those countries to begin the disarmament process with the actual physical destruction of some major armaments. One of the best features of that approach is that it would involve only the simplest sort of verification. An early agreement to send to the scrapheap some of the major means which the great powers now have of delivering nuclear weapons to their targets would reassure a sometimes sceptical world that the great powers were really serious about disarmament. It would also ensure that those aircraft — obsolescent by super power standards — would not be sold to lesser powers, in whose hands they might threaten neighbouring countries.

Bomber Reduction

It would be an outstanding achievement if the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee could report to the coming session of the General Assembly that the powers had agreed on the destruction of a large number of bombers. In my view, this Committee should try to reach an arrangement which would cover many bombers as is feasible at the moment, but it should not invite delay or failure by trying to extend it too far. Once the process of actual physical destruction has been set in motion, we could consider the possibility of broadening the scope of this measure to include other types of nuclear-weapon carriers including some missiles, as I note was suggested by Mr. Thomas. We, therefore, hope that the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee will pursue vigorously the prospects for early action which these proposals offer.

While neither side has been prepared up to the present time to accept in their present form any of the collateral measures proposed by the other, I believe that a number of the proposals could be related in a way which would assist in the reconciliation of views. For example, if the Soviet Union has misgivings that a freeze of strategic nuclear-weapon vehicles would not ensure halting the over-all arms race, it might be convinced if an agreement on the freeze were combined with an agreement to undertake simultaneously the physical destruction of certain types of bombers on the lines of the United States proposal.