

that states might sign an agreement and later conduct secret tests, the nuclear powers must not only ask themselves whether this risk is acceptable in principle. They must also assess with equal care whether the military significance of such evasions would be greater or less than the dangers to health and security resulting from continued testing and an accelerated arms race.

This balance of risks and advantages has to be kept in mind in order that the negotiating parties may assess the real significance of possible espionage or evasions. As long as the negotiators concentrate their attention on the disadvantages to their security which might result from a particular system of inspection, it is doubtful whether any real progress is possible. But when these disadvantages are seen in their proper perspective, against the graver prospects of continued testing, the necessary conditions will exist to bring an effective test ban to reality. If the negotiating parties can readjust their thinking in this way, new compromises, acceptable to both sides, could be achieved without delay.

In conclusion, Mr. Chairman, let me review briefly the main considerations which will guide my Delegation in dealing with the questions to be decided under the present item: First, we wish to see a halt -- by January 1, 1963 or earlier -- to all nuclear-weapons tests; second, as a means of achieving this end, we support the proposal for an immediate test ban in the atmosphere, outer space and under water; third, we desire an effective international agreement which will provide assurances that no further tests are carried out and that all states live up to their obligations under the treaty. We are convinced that these objectives demand urgent attention, and we sincerely hope that this Committee will act quickly and forcefully to assist in their realization. I can assure you, Mr. Chairman, that the Canadian Delegation will give its full support and active co-operation in the endeavour.

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