

time to any noticeable extent. So this right of repatriation, without that particular qualification in its terms, does exist.....

On the other hand the other issue -no force to be used in connection with prisoners-of-war -involves a principle which we on our side could not and would not give up; because if we had done so, we would have violated the understanding we had and the undertaking which we gave to some of these prisoners who came over from the other side.

The Indian resolution was an effort to reconcile these two points of view in a way which should be acceptable to all men of good will on either side. It did that in terms of the resolution; and to carry out those terms and make this reconciliation effective in practice as well as in principle, it set up a Repatriation Commission to which prisoners would be immediately released as the first stage of their repatriation. That Repatriation Commission, which would have taken over the prisoners from the detaining powers, would have consisted of Czechoslovakia and Poland, two Communist states; Sweden and Switzerland, two non-Communist states; and provision was made for the appointment of an umpire who will be an important member of that Commission if it is, ever set up. If that kind of Commission could not be established, an alternative procedure for setting one up is embodied in the resolution.

We considered this resolution to be, on the part of the Indian delegation, an important and constructive move to solve this question. It was not a perfect resolution; it was not clear in all of its terms, and there were reasons for some of those ambiguities. But we felt that it was a resolution which could work and which, if it did work, would bring the fighting in Korea to an end; so we in the Canadian delegation gave it our support from the beginning.

We were then confronted by two problems. One was whether we should give this resolution priority over our own 21-Power Resolution, and we agreed to do that as did all the other sponsoring powers of the 21-Power Resolution. The other problem was to achieve the maximum support possible for this Indian resolution. To do that certain clarifications -certain changes, if you like -were required. These in their turn required long and difficult discussions and negotiations between the authors of the resolution and certain other governments who wished to see it clarified in certain respects.

At this stage, ..., if I may, I should like to pay a tribute of the honesty of purpose, the industry and the refusal to give way to discouragement of the Indian authors of this resolution who, at this time, and at the United Nations, took a responsibility which I think we must all applaud. In the press, of course, there were reports of differences. In the process of negotiating clarification between the United States delegation and between other delegations there were such differences, but they were not as fundamental or as important as might appear from reading some of the reports. There were, however, sincere differences of approach and differences of opinion about what should be clarified in this resolution in order to make it acceptable to everybody.