

- A facility investigation would not proceed unless a simple majority of the Executive Council voted for it to go forward.
- A field investigation of alleged use of biological weapons on the territory of the requesting state-party would go forward unless three-quarters of the Executive Council voted to stop it.
- A field investigation of alleged use of biological weapons on the territory of another state-party would proceed unless a simple majority of the Executive Council voted to stop it.
- A field investigation of an outbreak of disease on the territory of the requesting state-party would go forward unless two-thirds of the Executive Council voted to stop it.
- A field investigation of an outbreak of disease on the territory of another state-party would not proceed unless a simple majority of the Executive Council voted for it to go forward.

A country would be given notice of a planned facility investigation at least 12 hours before the arrival of an investigating team in the country. It would have to provide the team access to the facility in question within 108 hours of being notified of the investigation. The investigating team could not exceed 25 members or break down into more than two groups, unless otherwise agreed by the investigated state. And such an investigation could not exceed 84 consecutive hours without agreement by the receiving state.

A state would receive notice of an impending field investigation at least 12 hours before the arrival of an investigating team in the country. The state would have to provide the investigating team—which could not exceed 30 members without the receiving state's approval—access to the area to be investigated within 48 hours of the team's arrival. The investigation could not go on for more than 30 days without an extension authorized by the Executive Council and agreed to by the receiving state-party.

As with visits, the text contains a number of measures to protect an investigated state. For example, as a rule, an investigating team would start its investigation with the least intrusive measures and progress to more intrusive measures 'only as required to fulfill its mandate.' In addition, the investigated state would have the right to protect national security and confidential information by using 'managed access' techniques, such as shrouding sensitive equipment or limiting the time the investigation team could spend in any area. The investigated state could also receive copies of all information gathered during the investigation.

The investigating team and receiving state would negotiate the nature and extent of access to an investigated area. But the receiving state would have 'the right to make the final decision' on such matters. During a facility investigation, the receiving state-party would have the explicit right to restrict access to 'particularly sensitive' parts of buildings 'not related to the investigation mandate.' However, if less than full access to an investigated area is provided during any investigation, the receiving state-party is expected to 'make every reasonable and feasible effort to provide alternative means to demonstrate compliance and to clarify the possible non-compliance concern.'

Protective measures also extend to the collection of material. The receiving state-party may request that certain samples, documents, or other materials not be removed if necessary to protect national security or commercial proprietary information. A receiving state could even refuse to allow an investigating team to take samples during a facility investigation.