

7. Approaches for suspected development of chemical weapons

7.1. Verification principles

(a) The principle of verification of suspected chemical weapons development is anomaly detection.

(b) An anomaly is defined for the purpose of this type of verification as any condition or evidence that may be the result of the development of chemical weapons. Conclusive evidence would, for the purpose of this type of verification, inter alia, be:

- (i) the presence of chemical weapons prototypes;
- (ii) the presence of Schedule-[1]-chemicals in facilities not licensed to handle these chemicals;
- (iii) the discovery of documentations or records which unmistakably show that the activities carried out were aimed at developing chemical weapons.

Supportive evidence may, inter alia, be a laboratory/facility design which enables to carry out experiments with unusual amounts (several hundred grammes or even more) of supertoxic or unknown new types of chemicals, including experiments pertaining to dissemination studies, pilot-plant production studies, or environmental fate assessments. If such features are discovered, proper explanation about the purpose of those experiments need to be requested from the facility operator or person in command, whatever applicable.

7.2. Verification methods

The following methods can, inter alia, be applied either in isolation or in combination:

- (i) sampling and analysis;
- (ii) interviews with personnel selected by the inspection team;
- (iii) visual inspection;
- (iv) photographic recording;
- (v) inspection of books, records and other documentation.

The choice of methods as well as verification efforts to be applied will depend on the specific nature of the inspected facility (type of laboratory or facility, nature of activities carried out there, etc.).