

Many have argued³⁷ that the counter-revolution in Chile brought with it a reconsideration of the tactics of peaceful struggle and a growing stress on revolutionary violence as a path to socialism. The effect of the Chilean affair on Soviet attitudes is, however, somewhat ambiguous. Some Soviet authors³⁸ argued that one reason for the coup had been the failure of Allende and his allies to move by "direct action" against the middle class and the army. This position was, however, contested by others who condemned the revolutionary romanticism of the extreme left Movimiento Izquierda Revolucionario (MIR) and argued that careless economic policy and the failure of the Allende regime to honour its promises of respect for private property were unwise, in that they alienated the middle class.³⁹ Jerry Hough notes that this intense disagreement in a single issue of a journal was highly unusual in Soviet publishing practice.⁴⁰

Soviet leaders and many scholars took pains to stress that important progress had been made in Chile by peaceful means under Allende. Brezhnev in 1976 noted that the fall of the Allende regime should not be taken as a refutation of the tactic of peaceful struggle.⁴¹ Allied parties in Central America continued to eschew in-

³⁷ J. Valenta, "The Soviet Union", in A. Adelman and R. Reading, eds., *Confrontation in the Caribbean Basin* (Pittsburgh: Center for Latin American Studies, 1984), p. 242.

³⁸ K.I. Maidanik, "Vokrug Urokov Chili" *Latinskaia Amerika* (1974), #5, pp. 119-121.

³⁹ E.A. Kosarev, "Ekonomika i mirnyi put revolyutsii" *Latinskaya Amerika* (1974), #5, pp. 95, 96, 99-100.

⁴⁰ Ramet and Lopez-Alves incorrectly cite Hough in support of their contention that "the general consensus among Soviet observers of the Latin American scene . . . was that recourse to extra-legal means should not have been eschewed" (*op. cit.*, [note 37] p. 348). Hough actually referred to a general consensus of "major outsiders" (i.e. non-specialists in Latin American studies) (*op. cit.*, [note 2] p. 131) and went on to describe at length the lack of consensus on this subject among Latin Americanists. Ramet and Lopez-Alves asserted on the basis of this incorrect citation that: "It is a direct line from this conclusion to a Soviet encouragement of guerrilla activity in Latin America." (*loc. cit.*). This is not only of questionable accuracy, since Soviet Latin Americanists were careful not to generalize for the continent as a whole from the Chilean experience, and since the relative degree of influence enjoyed by "outsiders" in comparison with that of Latin Americanists is unknown. It is also a *non sequitur*, since "extra-legal means", or for that matter armed struggle, are far broader categories than is that of "guerrilla activity". As S. Mikoyan put it: "To examine the armed path solely in terms of the creation of partisan brigades and of the attempt relying solely on their forces to defeat the regular army — this is a vulgarization of revolutionary theory." S. Mikoyan, "Ob Osobennostyakh Revolyutsii v Nikaragua" *Latinskaya Amerika* (1980), #3, pp. 35-6.

⁴¹ C. Blasier, Comment on Valenta's article in Adelman, *op. cit.*, note 37, p. 271.