balance remaining due, or resume possession of the engine and sell it, and, after paying themselves, pay any surplus to the lessee. The lessee, after paying an instalment, became bankrupt. The lessors took no steps to recover the balance due or to sell the engine, which was taken possession of by the trustee in bankruptcy, whereupon the "lessors" applied to the Bankruptcy Court for an order for the delivery of the engine to them. The question turned on whether or not the effect of the agreement was to transfer the property in the engine to the bankrupt. If it did, then the agreement would be void for non-registration under the Bills of Sale Act. Their lordships (Lord Herschell, L.C., and Watson, Ashbourne, and Shand) were unanimously of the opinion that the effect of the agreement was not to vest the property in the engine in the lessee, and that therefore registration under the Bills of Sale Act was unnecessary, and they therefore affirmed the order of the Irish court directing the delivery up of the engine to the lessors.

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In the case of Foveaux, Cross v. London Anti-Vivisection Society, 1895, 2 Ch., 501, it became necessary to determine whether a society for the suppression of vivisection is a "charity" within the legal meaning of the term. The case arose in this way: A lady having power to appoint a fund in favor of charity made an appointment of it in favor of an anti-vivisection society, and the question was whether this was a valid execution of the power. Chitty, J., held that the society was a charity in the technical sense, and upheld the gift. The intention of such societies, he holds, is to benefit the community; but whether, if they achieved their object, the community would, in fact, be benefited was a question he did not feel called on to express an opinion.

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Melville v. Mirror of Life Co., 1895, 2 Ch., 531, was an action for the infringement of the copyright of a photograph. At the request of the plaintiff a well-known athlete, named Crossland, allowed the plaintiff to take a photograph of him. The plaintiff made no charge, but gave Crossland some copies. No agreement was made as to copyright, but it was understood that the plaintiff was to be at liberty to sell copies. When the photograph was taken the plaintiff's son was present and performed the operation, while the plaintiff looked on and merely directed Crossland how to look. The plaintiff was duly registered as the proprietor of the copyright in the picture. The defendants applied to the plaintiff for a copy, and for permission to publish it, but their request was not granted. They then obtained one of the copies given to Crossland and published a copy of that in their newspaper, and for so doing the action was brought. It was contended that the son of the plaintiff was the "author" of the photograph, and not the plaintiff; but Kekewich, J., held that the father was the "author" within the meaning of the Act, and that the son merely acted as his servant in taking the photograph, and that the father was, consequently, rightly entitled to the copyright. He also held that the photograph was not taken "for or on behalf of Crossland," and, therefore, the proviso of section 1 of the Act (25 & 26 Vict., c. 68) did not apply. He also held that section 6 of the Act precluded Crossland, as well as other persons but the plaintiff, from multiplying copies without the plaintiff's leave.

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In *re* Burrows, Cleghorn v. Burrows, 1895, 2 Ch. 497, 13 R., Sept., 117, was a simple question in the construction of a will, whereby land was devised to the plaintiff "absolutely" in case she has issue living at the death of the testator's wife, and, if not, then over. The fact was that, at the death of the testator's wife, the plaintiff had no children born, but she was then *enceinte*, and the following day was delivered of a living child. The question was whether this unborn child could be considered as "issue living" at the death of the testator's wife. Chitty, J., had no difficulty in deciding that question in the affirmative.

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Betjemmann v. Betjemmann, 1895, 2 Ch. 474, was an action brought by the