

RECRUITS FOR THE ARMY.

The returns just issued for the year 1866 show that in that year 20,410 recruits were inspected 6811 or 331 per 1000, were rejected at the primary inspection, and 950 at the secondary inspection, making a total of 7761, or 380 per 1000, rejected in the aggregate, and leaving 12,649 to pass into the army. Compared with the results in 1865, the proportion rejected shows a reduction of 45 per 1000. Of 8315 recruits passed at the primary inspections by army medical officers, 208 were subsequently rejected, while of 5384 passed by civil medical practitioners, 742 were rejected, these numbers being respectively in the proportion of 25 and 140 per 1000 of the recruits found fit in the first instance, against 38 and 149 per 1000 in 1865. The results, therefore, for 1866 show a lower ratio of rejections in both groups than in the preceding year. Of the total recruits examined, 3918 were inspected at the head-quarters of the recruiting districts, 4356 at regiments and depots, and 7135 by civil medical practitioners. The proportions rejected varied considerably at the several recruiting districts. Belfast and Leeds were the districts in which the primary rejections were highest, then followed Glasgow and Liverpool. Bristol and London were the districts in which the lowest ratio of primary rejections occurred. At the secondary inspection Leeds had the highest ratio of rejections. The rejections at primary inspections by army medical officers, compared with those by civil practitioners, were in the proportion of 373 to 260; but when the recruits had passed through the secondary inspection the difference in the results amounted only to 26 per 1000. Compared with the results of the previous year, there was a marked decrease in the proportion of English recruits rejected, a slight decrease among Irish recruits, and a slight decrease in the proportion of Scottish recruits rejected. Out of every 1000 recruits, 697 came from England and Wales, 78 from Scotland, 219 from Ireland, and six from the colonies and foreign parts; these figures show a considerable increase in the proportion of English, but a decrease in Scotch and Irish recruits, compared with the preceding year. The highest ratio of rejections was among the recruits for the Foot Guards, and the lowest among those for the Household Cavalry. Compared with 1865, the results for the year under review show a slight increase in the proportion rejected for the Household Cavalry, and a considerable decrease in all the other arms, but especially in the cavalry of the line and Military Train. It is curious to note the causes assigned for the unfitness of the recruits rejected. Varicose veins no longer stand first on the list of causes of rejection; the reduction in the proportion rejected for this cause places it second on the list, and diseases of the eyes and eyelids stand first in point of frequency of the causes of unfitness. Compared with the results for 1865, there has been a reduction of about 8 per 1000 in the defects of the lower extremities, and in loss or decay of many teeth, 54 per 1000. The following are the most frequent causes of unfitness:—Diseases of the eyes and eyelids, 582, or 43 per 1000; varicose veins, 721 or 35 per 1000; small or malformed chest or curvature of spine, 723 or 35 per 1000; defects of lower extremities, 604 or 30 per 1000; variocoele, 542 or 27 per 1000; muscular tenuity, 525, or 26 per 1000; disease of heart, 513, or 25

per 1000; unsound health, 414, or 20 per 1000. Less frequent causes of rejection were syphilis, loss or decay of teeth, hernia, ulcers, wounds, and cicatrices. The proportion of recruits furnished by each group of occupations was as follows.—In every thousand, 609 were labourers, husbandmen and servants, 144 were manufacturing artisans, 156 were mechanics, 63 were shopmen and clerks, 5 were engaged in professional occupations, and 12 were boys. The class of mechanics employed in occupations favorable to physical development furnished a higher proportion than in 1865. The highest proportions of rejections were in the class of mechanics—419 per 1000; and in the class of manufacturing artisans, 400 per 1000; the lowest exclusive of boys, was among the professional class, and among labourers, &c. Of every 1000 recruits examined by army medical officers, 206 were unable to read or write, 87 were able to read only, and 707 were able to read and write. These results show that a larger proportion was able to read and write than in 1865, but it indicates a deplorable amount of ignorance to find that one fifth of the whole number of recruits examined was unable to read or write. The ages of the recruits of 1866 show that enlistments under 18 years of age and at 25 years of age and upwards were less numerous than in 1865, but there was a considerable increase in the proportion between the ages of 18 and 20 years. The returns relating to height record the proportion of men above 5 ft. 9 in. as being less than in 1865 at the head-quarters of recruiting districts, and among recruits inspected by civil practitioners, but higher among those at regiments and depots. Of every 10,000 inspected, 8989 were under 6 ft. 9 in.; 532 were 5 ft. 9 in. and under 5 ft. 10 in.; 375 were 5 ft. 10 in. and under 6 ft.; and 104 were 6 ft. and upwards. Of every 10,000 recruits inspected at head-quarters of the districts, 99 weighed less than 100 lbs. each, 253 less than 110 lbs. each, 2134 less than 120 lbs. each, 3448 less than 130 lbs. each, 2411 less than 140 lbs. each, and 1211 less than 150 lbs. each, and 444 weighed each 150 lbs. and upwards. It is gratifying to observe that in 1865 there was a reduction in the ratio of recruits rejected at 22 per 1000, and in 1866 of 46 per 1000, as before stated. 448 per 1000 being rejected in 1864, 426 per 1000 in 1865, and 380 per 1000 in 1866.

THE REVOLVER VS THE SABRE.

From the U. S. Army and Navy Journal.

A correspondent of the *Canadian Volunteer Review* takes exceptions to the conclusions reached by Colonel Denison, in his *Modern Cavalry Tactics*, in regard to the revolver for the sabre in future cavalry operations. Data derived from the peculiar exigencies of our late war are, he maintains, necessarily defective and unsatisfactory; hastily raised and imperfectly disciplined levies are "no proper criterion, either in equipment, arms or mode of fighting," for troops instructed under more favorable circumstances. It is utterly impossible, he declares, to unite a reliance upon the pistol with the high *morale* that urges the *Sabreur* to place his foot within the sweep of his blade. "Teach cavalry to depend upon fire arms, and its prototype is found in the infantry that hesitates, pauses and then begins to fire in a bayonet attack."

There is some truth in this, but we think it proves too much. If we are to furnish

our troops with imperfect weapons, for the purpose of increasing their *morale*, why not return at once to the short sword and the shield of the Roman soldier? All such reasonings as thus overlook the fact that *morale* in troops is the result of a combination of influences, of which confidence in their weapons is one. Other things being equal, the troops who are the most efficiently armed will have the most *morale*. We say, other things being equal; of course, if they have not the same advantages of race, of enthusiasm, of education and discipline, they will fail in this, in spite of their armament. But, having all these, increased efficiency in armament must give them the advantage in *morale*.

The improvement of weapons is simply one way of reinforcing the moral and physical power by the intellectual; and the farther this improvement is carried, the greater the increase in efficiency. It is proper to argue, as this writer does, that for the peculiar service of cavalry the sabre is the most efficient weapon; the whole question turns on this point. A little experience is worth a good deal of theory in determining it, and if our late war does not furnish this experience, it will be hard to find it. Our armies were undoubtedly composed almost entirely of raw levies in the beginning, and, to a considerable extent, at the end; but toward the close we had troops in all arms of the service who had been transformed into trained soldiers by the most valuable of all discipline—the discipline of four years in the field. Col. Denison is right, therefore, in referring to these troops for the data upon which he bases his conclusions in regard to the changes required in *Modern Cavalry Tactics*. Whether these conclusions are or are not accepted as sound, we do not believe they can be set aside by a denial of the facts upon which they are based.

THE ANNIVERSARY OF MENTANA.

The correspondent of the *Daily News* writing from Florence, on November 4, says—"We had in Florence, on the evening of yesterday, the anniversary of the fight at Mentana, a political demonstration, though it would be hard to say whether the demonstration was one made by a handful of dirty little ragged boys against a small party of soldiers, or that small party of soldiers against the dirty little ragged boys. Nothing could be more ridiculous than the whole affair, but the greater amount of ridicule was fairly incurred by the Government who lent additional importance to the cries of the juvenile ragamuffins by ordering the riflemen to turn out against them. The proceedings of the morning had been very quiet and orderly. Groups of persons, most of them young lads, who had taken part in the last Garibaldian expedition, assembled at an early hour on the Piazza Santa Croce, marched thence to the burial-ground of San Miniato, where speeches were delivered honouring the memory of those who had fallen at Mentana. Then they returned with equal order and quiet; and on reaching the Piazza della Signoria, dispersed. It is probable that the evening would have passed off just as quietly but for the absurd display of military force on the last named Piazza, which of course had the effect of attracting a set of boys certainly not more than 50 in number, and none above 12 years of age, who evidently considered, as a most legitimate lark, the