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MEXICO AND ITS FATE.

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BY GORE.

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WE are not of those Politicians who view in the struggle at present existing between Mexico and the United States, the sure, but progressive absorption of the former people, by the latter power. We do not indeed esteem very highly either the military or financial means of the Indo-Spanish Republic, nor pretend to undervalue the resources of their young, but giant antagonist. Believing thus, notwithstanding, we venture to prophecy a speedy arrangement between the two belligerents, or a disastrous issue to the United States.—Upon the active resistance of the ten millions which Mexico numbers, we have not assumed this belief; on that far more effective, though inert power, which lies in the vast waste, and desert-like character of the frontier, is this opinion chiefly predicated. Between the Neuces and the Rio Grande, the country, with but a few and very limited exceptions, is sandy and waterless; in the more northern track the same characteristics prevail over an immense area,—the travelling distance from Fort Independence to the capital of New Mexico, (Santa Fé,) is no less than 775 miles, while from that city to the Brasos and San Jago, (the two extremities of the line from which effective operations against Mexico are to be directed,) it is hardly under a thousand, throughout presenting the same sterile features the moment the river valley is lost to sight.—This physical peculiarity determines insuperable difficulties to the advance and support of a large force, unless at enormous cost. “The army must act at a vast distance from its base of operations. The country is without inhabitants, roads or supplies; everything for the use of the troops must be conveyed from the valley of the Mississippi.” Think of projecting an ill-disciplined array into such a country, (and however brave the volunteers who will form the bulk of the American troops, such a charge must long apply to them,) we feel it must speedily melt away under the severe privations it will of necessity endure. Imagine a two months’ march of this kind by twenty thousand men—the distance from Matamoras to Mexico, seven hundred miles, could not be crossed in a shorter period,—and the conquest and absorption of the Mexican provinces becomes a matter of difficult if not impossible attainment. Hence, we repeat, that unless the struggle be speedily terminated, it must result disastrously to the United States. A body of men of the amount above indicated, kept well in hand, bearing with them the requisite means of attack and support, might unquestionably, by abandoning their communications, and moving as a caravan or flying camp, be directed upon Northern California