

subordinate powers of legislation were expressly vested in the grantees.

The extent of the rights conveyed, and of the territory granted, is not to be decided by the narrow rules of local ordinances, or those confined regulations of the municipal code, which apply to the termination of differences between individual and individual; but must be determined by more liberal and comprehensive principles,—by doctrines of more general and extensive application. Between individual and individual, length of possession might constitute Right, but between an individual and a Sovereign, or between an individual and a Colony or Government, a claim founded only on prescription could not exist.

The points which seem, on the present occasion, most deserving of consideration, are the exclusive trade and the limits of the Hudson's Bay Territory. On the subject of the Trade, some have laid it down as a principle, that the Crown cannot grant an exclusive right of Trade, without the concurrence or confirmation of Parliament. Differences of opinion rarely arise with respect to those rules which are entitled to the denomination of "principles;" the most frequent subjects of contest concern only their application. But on this position, dignified with the appellation of a "principle," it may be observed, that the only judicial opinion ever given by English Courts on such a subject, declared a grant of exclusive trade by the crown to be legal. This opinion, it is true, was given by Chief Justice Jefferies, and may not, therefore, be considered as entitled to such authority as opinions drawn from other sources might obtain; but it must here be remarked,—and the observation will be conclusive with respect to the pretensions of