

If the maintenance of the reliability of existing nuclear stockpiles is advanced as the rationale for continued testing, is it not the case that, when nuclear arsenals are as large and as varied as those of the United States and the U.S.S.R., even some uncertainty regarding a portion of the weapons constituting the strategic deterrent would hardly jeopardize the condition of "assured destruction capacity" that is regarded as the key to mutual deterrence?

Reduction of suspicions

If both super-powers accept the state of mutual deterrence, the maintenance of which traditionally has been advanced as a reason for continuing testing of nuclear warheads, why would a CTB that served to impede efforts to upset the stability of the strategic balance not be preferable to continuing potentially destabilizing advances made possible by further nuclear testing? One main value of a CTB could be precisely a reduction of the suspicions and fears that some major, destabilizing progress was being made by the other side in an unrestrained testing situation.

The choice that confronts us all is between, on the one hand, the risks inherent in an underground test ban, compliance with which can only be verified up to a percentage bound to be something less than 100, and, on the other, the increasing dangers presented by a continued nuclear arms race, including the related risks of further additions to the "nuclear weapons club" if the existing nuclear powers fail to set an example of nuclear restraint.

Despite the advances that have been made in recent years, no seismological verification — and no on-site inspection system of itself, for that matter — can guarantee that all violations of a test ban could be detected. What is necessary is that the parties to the ban should have a higher degree of confidence in their abilities to detect violations than a potential violator has in his ability to evade detection. For the main deterrent against violation is obviously the sizable risk of being discovered (rather than a 100 percent certainty of identifying all underground events), together with the knowledge that the violator, if detected, would face condemnation, the termination of the test ban and the resumption of the nuclear arms race.

There is an additional important consideration to be borne in mind: world peace and security may be further endangered if nuclear weapons are to proliferate beyond the existing level, which,

with the inclusion of China among the permanent members of the Security Council, provides a natural plateau from which to try to prevent the breakdown of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).

Article VI of this treaty, which was signed in 1968 and entered into force in 1970, clearly places an obligation on the nuclear parties to accept effective restraints on the arms race and on the competition in the improvement of their own nuclear weapons as a necessary counterpart to the self-denying ordinance accepted by the non-nuclear parties to the treaty.

Article VI reads as follows:

Each of the Parties to the Treaty undertakes to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures *relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date* and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control. (author's italics)

The Secretary of State for External Affairs stressed the connection between nuclear testing and the NPT in his statement in the House of Commons on October 15, 1971, when he called upon the United States and the U.S.S.R. to fulfil the formal treaty obligations to which the NPT binds them in Article VI. The Minister declared:

Unless the two major nuclear powers are willing to accept effective restraints on their arms race and on the competition in the improvement of their own nuclear weapons — as they are committed to do under Article VI of the Non-Proliferation Treaty — they cannot expect the two less highly developed nuclear powers, France and China, and the so-called 'near-nuclear powers' to accept or respect the restraints of the Non-Proliferation Agreement which the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R. sponsored.

If serious negotiations are not begun soon to seek a compromise solution to the CTB problem and if even the modest restraints on nuclear testing suggested by Canada cannot be accepted and implemented, how can the two super-powers party to the NPT claim to be fulfilling either the injunction concerning the "cessation" (and not just the curtailing) of the nuclear-arms race or their undertaking in the Moscow PTB Treaty which I noted earlier?

Disturbing the pattern

Moreover, if the NPT breaks down, the strategic pattern would be disturbed, and the effects of this are likely to come into play in the politically "hottest" international areas. Military and political destabilization and increasing world tensions will loom large if the NPT is not rendered viable.

Through the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks, the United States and the

The dangers of a breakdown in nuclear pact