

not been discussed between those who were going to make it to see if they could not make it a joint peace.

Nevertheless the first time there was any personal contact between the representatives of the western powers and the Russians, such contact was between Mr. Churchill, Mr. Roosevelt and Mr. Stalin. Their foreign ministers issued and they themselves approved the Moscow declaration of October 30, 1943. It seemed at that time that all those who were fighting the axis powers were being spoken for at this conference by the three great civil leaders I have mentioned, namely Mr. Churchill, Mr. Roosevelt and Mr. Stalin. There they declared that they would jointly pledge their united action for the prosecution of war until their respective enemies would surrender, and they stated:

They recognize the necessity of establishing at the earliest practicable date a general international organization, based on the principle of the sovereign equality of all peace loving states . . . for the purpose of maintaining international peace and security pending the reestablishment of law and order and the inauguration of a system of general security, they will consult with one another and, as occasion requires, with other members of the united nations with a view to joint action on behalf of the community of nations.

It states that they will consult with one another and, as occasion requires, with others of the allied nations, with a view to joint action on behalf of the community of nations.

At Dumbarton Oaks the proposals for the establishment of the united nations were drawn up. In those proposals there was included as chapter 12 the following transitional arrangements:

Pending the coming into force of the special agreement or agreements referred to in chapter 8, and in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 5 of the four-nation declaration, signed at Moscow, on October 30, 1943, the states parties to that declaration should consult with each other and as occasion arises with other members of the organization with a view to such joint action on behalf of the organization as may be necessary for the purpose of maintaining international peace and security.

That was in the Dumbarton Oaks proposals. Then the Dumbarton Oaks proposals were followed by the Yalta conference, in the Crimea. Again, the Yalta conference was a conference between Mr. Churchill, Mr. Roosevelt and Mr. Stalin; and there they agreed to set up a control commission for Germany. They stated:

Under the agreed plan, the forces of the three powers will each occupy a separate zone in Germany. Coordinated administration and control have been provided for under the plan through a central control commission consisting of the supreme commanders of the three powers, with headquarters in Berlin. It has been agreed

that France should be invited by the three powers, if she should so desire, to take over a zone of occupation and to participate as a fourth member of the control commission. The limits of the French zone will be agreed by the four governments concerned through their representatives on the European advisory commission.

At the time of San Francisco we knew that was the way in which they were interpreting this transitory provision which had been put into the Dumbarton Oaks proposals; and when the Dumbarton Oaks proposals were being discussed at San Francisco hon. members who were on the delegation will recall what objection was taken to the continuation of that system, whereby the three or four were going to dominate the situation.

If hon. members will refer to page 63 and following of the report they will find summarized a record of the objections made.

Mr. GRAYDON: Doctor Evatt, for instance.

Mr. ST. LAURENT: And not only Doctor Evatt. It will be seen that Canada took an active part in disputing the advisability of leaving that kind of clause in the charter of the united nations. The big powers insisted upon putting it to a vote, and it was defeated by a vote of twenty-one to nine.

There was substituted a clause which was somewhat better, but which still contained some of the objections which Canada was making to the continuance of that system, a system which may have been all right during the war. It was necessary during the war to have this small group meeting and making decisions. But it was felt that that should not be projected into the peace.

Nevertheless we got at San Francisco the best that it seemed possible to obtain, if we were to get anything; and we accepted article 106 of the charter, which is a provision along those lines, with modified language. I shall not take time to read it into the record, but hon. members will find it as article 106 of the charter.

It was not the kind of article we wanted; but it formed part of the price we had to pay, with the other smaller nations, to get the united nations charter. And it was felt that it was better to get a charter with that in it, with the veto provision in it, and the other preferred positions that were given to the "Big Five", than not to have any charter at all.

It has been suggested that we should have left troops in occupation in Germany. Well, is it suggested that they should have been part of the Russian force? Is it suggested that they should have been part of the French forces of occupation? Is it suggested that they should have been part of the United States forces of occupation? Is it suggested they