

be. Hon. members can find an account of that at page 2125 of *Hansard* of 1941, where I discussed the matter.

Could there be any conceivable explanation of that most ill-advised move, except that the sugar controller, appointed definitely to hurt the beet sugar industry, seized the first opportunity afforded and exposed and overplayed his hand? A wave of popular opposition developed across the country; or it may be that on second thought the controller was led to change his decision so as to allow the 1,300 acres to come back into production. At any rate, in the light of what happened since, the minister must realize that that was a most fantastic order for the sugar administrator to allow to go out when he had the power with respect to sugar at the beginning of the war—a most dangerous power from the point of view of the industry.

Another evidence of Liberal lack of sympathy with the beet sugar industry is this: The government and government spokesmen have used various specious arguments against the beet sugar industry. They argued that it was not economic in Canada. The speciousness of this argument I have revealed in what I have said. It is nonsense.

The government spokesmen constantly proclaimed that beet growing and the manufacture of beet sugar are too expensive to be carried on successfully without high tariff protection. I will ask the minister this question, and he can reply to it later if he sees fit: Is it not a fact that the Canadian sugar tariff is constructed in such a way as to protect the Canadian refiners of cane sugar, and that it only accidentally proves a partial protection to the beet sugar producer? Do not tariff items 134, 135, 135b, clearly answer this question in the affirmative? Does not this affirmative answer become extremely emphatic when these Canadian tariff items are compared with the corresponding items of the tariff structures of the United States and the United Kingdom?

Again, government spokesmen spread the story that Canada signed the London sugar agreement in 1937, contracting not to aid the further development of the beet sugar industry. Is this story not false? The minister will have to confess that it is. Is it not true that Canada never did sign the London agreement? Yet people in the government have urged upon me the alleged fact that Canada had signed this solemn agreement and therefore had to keep her pledge.

Liberal spokesmen constantly spread the story that the development of the beet sugar industry lost for us the fish and potato market which the maritimes need. Even the Minister of Agriculture had accepted this

fallacy, as is clearly shown by replies he gave to certain hon. gentlemen on May 29, as reported at page 1994 of *Hansard*. One suspects that somebody must be deliberately falsifying. Listen to this from "Reports on Markets for Dried and Pickled Fish", prepared by O. F. MacKenzie and F. Homer Zwicker, printed by the king's printer, issued by the Department of Fisheries, Ottawa, in 1938. On page 17 of the report there appears the following:

A great deal of idle and ill-informed comment has been in circulation regarding the so-called dump duty on refined sugar from Cuba, imposed in 1932 being responsible for the loss of Canada's market in fish and potatoes in Cuba. Careful study of the Cuban graph is invited and this study will definitely prove that the West India treaty is responsible for the loss of the Cuban market, and the dump duty had nothing to do with the downward turn in the trend of trade with Cuba.

In 1926, the year before the West India treaty was proclaimed, we did a business with Cuba of just under twenty million dollars. At that time Canadian fish entered Cuba at the low duty of \$1.30 per 100 kilos and potatoes at 65 cents per 100 kilos. In 1930, with the West India treaty becoming effective, this trade has shrunk to less than eight million dollars. At this stage Cuba raised their duty on codfish from \$1.30 to \$3 per 100 kilos. In 1931, with trade down to five million, the duties were increased to \$4 and consular charges were also drastically increased. In 1932, Cuba again increased duties on codfish to \$5.50 per 100 kilos where it has remained. By this time, as the graph so clearly shows, the market for codfish in Cuba was practically gone. After a further slight decline the following year, the demand had been increasing, and in both 1936 and 1937, Canada's exports of codfish to Cuba were considerably more than what they were the year dump duties were enforced.

Surely, Mr. Speaker, that publication was available to the members of the government; and in the face of those facts how can they possibly excuse themselves for this story that has gone out about the destruction of the maritimes market for potatoes and codfish?

MR. SPEAKER: Order. The hon. gentleman's time has expired.

MR. BLACKMORE: I shall have more to say about this matter later, when the opportunity arises.

MR. RODNEY ADAMSON (York West): Mr. Speaker, I want to deal to-day with one particular aspect of the budget, more particularly the minister's statement last Friday night bringing the Canadian dollar to parity with the United States dollar. We in this party have emphasized, as have responsible citizens throughout Canada, that the only salvation for our economic future is increased production, particularly primary production. This is the third and to me the most important part of our amendment. To be prosperous the Canadian economy must be at all times