

dividual case. This arises in part, perhaps, out of my own preoccupation with doing what can be done to examine and implement the findings of the Glassco Commission, which, as you know, was quite critical of the fact an excessive number of fairly small decisions required the attention of the Treasury Board—some 16,000 submissions having to be made by departments annually to a committee of, theoretically, six ministers sitting for the purpose of deciding whether or not a pension payable to a surviving common law wife of a civil servant should in fact be paid to the common law wife or to the legal surviving widow, or divided between the two of them. My own conclusion, I must say—and I think I will have to take some of the blame for this—was that where there were decisions of what I thought were an administrative order or that involved discretionary judgment applied to an individual situation—where there were decisions of that kind to be made, it was more appropriate to make them the responsibility of the Minister responsible for the administration of the superannuation legislation; and that Treasury Board should not be required to take the individual decisions that were part and parcel of the day-to-day administration of the act and regulations, and that Treasury Board should be required to take decisions only where matters of more general importance were at issue. This was the principle which led to the substitution of “the Minister” for the “Treasury Board” in certain clauses where the term “Treasury Board” had appeared in the past, and the retention of the reference to the Treasury Board or the Governor in Council in certain other instances.

Mr. BELL (*Carleton*): Was any consideration given to any technique of review in such circumstances, or is the minister's decision to be considered final in each of these cases?

Dr. DAVIDSON: I cannot say truthfully there was consideration given to the establishment of an appeal tribunal in the supervision of the act, no.

Mr. BELL (*Carleton*): Based on some past experience with superannuation cases, I have some very considerable qualms about this. I think it wise that it should be considered in the first instance by a minister, but I think also there is a most salutary effect when it goes to the Treasury Board for review. I fear that you may get a lack of uniformity in administration because of considerable differences in attitude between one minister and another. I feel there is a greater uniformity of administration when you have three or four ministers considering it together in Treasury Board because things are then inclined to even out.

Dr. DAVIDSON: I did not understand your point about three or four different ministers.

Mr. BELL (*Carleton*): The fact that you have three or four different ministers in the Treasury Board who have before them the report of the Treasury Board's staff gives you, in effect, a dual review of the situation. My experience has been that Treasury Board decisions have generally greater uniformity than, perhaps, ministerial decisions standing alone.

Mr. CHATTERTON: Mr. Chairman, I should like to pursue a question that was raised this morning. I have been thinking about it and I am not satisfied with the answer given. I am referring to this whole question of the combined pension under the new formula in relation to the survivor benefits. By 1968 all those