nationalism, xenophobia and ethnic rivalries; the failure of early attempts to reform democratic institutions or economic systems; and sheer human unpredictability provide a dangerous brew, which can be a recipe for intolerance and violence.

There must be well-understood rules of conduct; there must be stable democratic institutions; and there must be fair and wise administration of public policy or the region will sink into a pit of never-ending misunderstanding, mistrust and human suffering.

One approach that has already paid dividends is the inclusion of the emerging nations in established international peace and security institutions. For example, the association of the new republics with NATO in the North Atlantic Co-operation Council (NACC) brings them into a North Atlantic community of values. Their membership in the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE) obliges them to accept and implement the Helsinki principles on human rights and the treatment of minorities.

We intend to hold these countries to their commitments as new partners in the NACC and the CSCE. Should they abandon democracy, they will also abandon our assistance -- but common security institutions, such as the UN and the G-7, will be working actively to assist the development of the democratic process, as we also will on a bilateral basis. These security institutions can also bring emerging countries into a security network that is able to intervene when conflict does break out.

I was personally involved in getting the process going for hopefully resolving the problem of Nagorno-Karabakh -- so I have seen this new dynamic up close and in the real world.

Canada invented modern peacekeeping, and once again we have provided our expertise and training, with the contingent of 1,200 men and women who are now in Yugoslavia. But peacekeeping is our second preference after peacemaking, the building of confidence through the rule of law, which is the objective of our diplomacy in the CSCE negotiations now going on in Helsinki.

Peacemaking becomes much riskier when there are thousands of nuclear weapons under the control of Russia and other republics. Russia and the other three nuclear republics must hold to the course of nuclear weapons reductions agreed to with the United States. The transfer of nuclear weapons from Ukraine, Belarus and Kazahkstan must continue. This transfer of weapons was a condition of our diplomatic relations.

Any second thoughts about these transfers for reasons of subjective negotiating leverage with Russia, or politiques de grandeur, will test our good will in having extended that