

and western pressures. But communist imperialism, directed from Moscow or from Peking or both, has been too successful in exploiting, and in some cases in capturing these forces, even though communism as the agent of aggressive and reactionary imperialism cannot bring either freedom or progress to those it envelops. We know that, Mr. Chairman, but there are millions of destitute and despairing people in Asia who do not as yet.

In the second place we should, I think accept the fact that if this danger exists, and I think it does, there can be no objection to, indeed there should be approval of, regional collective security arrangements organized to meet those dangers in the right way, by those immediately concerned, under Article 51 of the United Nations Charter. We cannot support the principle of collective security in one part of the world and reject it in another. I think it is right and important that the United States of America should be reassured by its friends on this question of principle. Nevertheless, we should also recognize that in practice the type of collective security arrangements suitable for the Atlantic area might not be practical or desirable in Southeast Asia.

An understanding of these needs and these differences will assist, indeed I think will be essential in finding the right regional solution to the problem of security in that part of the world, once it is agreed that such a solution is necessary to supplement and make more binding the general application of the United Nations Charter. Any such regional solution, I think, might well embody the following principles:

First, arrangements reached must be consistent with the provisions of the United Nations Charter. If they could be associated in some form with the United Nations, so much the better.

Secondly, they must be divorced from anything that could be called colonialism and not designed to maintain regimes, colonial or national, that have little or no popular support.

Thirdly, it should be recognized that the problem cannot be dealt with effectively in military terms alone, and that no mere military agreement is likely to be satisfactory or enduring. Indeed military aggression of the conventional sort is not likely to be the main danger so much as communist imperialism exploiting those forces within the state--and not always unworthy forces--in order to bring about subversion, civil war and the forcible installation of communist regimes.

It should also be recognized that, as President Eisenhower said on May 12, no country can be saved from communism unless it wants to be saved.*

Then, fourth, as I see it, any solution must not be, or susceptible to the interpretation as being, a purely "western" one, or one from which free Asian countries feel that they have been excluded. Surely we must recognize that, whether we agree with all their policies or not, little of a substantial or permanent character is likely to be achieved in establishing peace and security in Southeast Asia, or any other part of Asia, without the