controls. It seeks to limit the spread of missiles and unmanned air vehicles/delivery systems capable of carrying at least a 500 kilogram payload at least 300 kilometers. Category I items, the export of which is subject to a presumption of denial, include complete rocket systems such as ballistic missile systems, space launch vehicles, and sounding rockets; unmanned air-vehicle systems such as cruise missiles, target and reconnaissance drones; specially-designed production facilities for these systems; and certain complete subsystems such as rocket engines or stages, re-entry vehicles, guidance sets, thrust-vector controls and warhead safing, arming, fuzing, and firing mechanisms.

Despite continuing efforts to delineate more carefully the items which contribute to proliferation, the MTCR's effectiveness could be reduced significantly over the coming decade because of disagreements over its interpretation among participants; questionable sales by China, even after the country has agreed to abide by the MTCR restraints; missile cooperation among Third World countries which are non-participants; and the proliferation spillovers of hardware and human resources resulting from the breakup of the former Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact.

Economic and political sanctions imposed by the United Nations Security Council might support the MTCR by enhancing compliance, making it more costly to acquire controlled missile-related systems, and reinforcing the international norm against missile proliferation. "Rewards," in the form of security guarantees or transfer of anti-tactical ballistic missile and air defense systems could also reduce incentives to acquire nuclear weapons and advanced delivery systems in situations where a country's adversary was armed with such threatening weapons systems.

The MTCR is not a treaty. A major step toward strengthening the Regime would be to re-negotiate it as an arms control agreement and to develop a verification regime which would strengthen its purpose of prohibiting or delaying the acquisition of advanced delivery systems for nuclear weapons, thus reducing the risks of nuclear proliferation. Such a verification regime could formalize the confidence-building measures called for under the Regime — information exchanges and notifications — and provide for on-site inspections by an international agency in a manner similar to the IAEA.

The Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC)

The CWC verification regime, like that for START, was designed and negotiated during the Cold War period to assure full compliance by the Soviet Union. Neither Russia nor any other Republic of the former Soviet Union are likely to pose any significant chemical weapons threat, although the destruction of the thousands of tons of chemicals used for weapons purposes will present serious environmental and economic problems. (Indeed the Russians have asked U.S. assistance in an attempt to find a process to recycle at least some of their estimated 40,000 tons of poison gases to help pay their costs for the destruction.) However, the current regime will result in chemical weapons and related facilities of the U.S., Canada, and other developed nations being subjected to extremely intrusive and costly inspections. Proliferators in the Third World will either not sign the Convention or will sign it with the intention of cheating on its provisions.

Approaches to the CWC verification regime have ranged from demands made until recently by the United States for "anywhere/anytime" unimpeded access to any declared or undeclared location or facility to arguments made by the U.K., among other countries, for "managed access" in order to protect sensitive installations and data.

The resulting agreement calls for the parties to accept mandatory access within any challenged site, with the option of up to five days delay for preparation, and the right of the inspected state to determine how much and what kind of access will be granted. This restrictive managed access approach limits both the immediacy and the degree of access to suspect