

These measures fall into several basic categories. One group is very similar to the pre-notification CBMs of the Helsinki Final Act and calls for timely advance notification of troop movements into and perhaps within the sensitive reduction zone. The package also included a requirement to periodically exchange information about personnel and armaments. These are what most analysts would consider classic Confidence-Building Measures. Another group of proposals is borrowed from SALT (the creation of a Standing Consultative Commission to both oversee the implementation of the treaty and deal with questions of compliance as well as an undertaking not to interfere with National Technical means of verification). These are problem-solving and verification-enhancing measures of a non-intrusive kind. The third and most controversial group dealt with inspection measures. These called for the actual placement of observers at designated entry and exit points within adversary regions as well as a limited number of mobile, aerial and "challenge" on-site inspections. This last group of measures is particularly important because it is indicative of the *only* direction in which CBMs can go if they are to reduce fears of surprise attack. This has long been recognized in principle (such measures were discussed in detail at the 1958 Surprise Attack Conference) but agreement on specific measures has proven elusive.

The Soviet reaction to the idea of inspection-oriented Associated Measures has not been enthusiastic. The basic Warsaw Treaty Organization position has been that National Technical Means of verification (predominantly reconnaissance satellites but also ground-based and aerial "listening posts") are adequate to ensure verification of agreements that, in any event, have not yet been negotiated. Given the extent of Warsaw Treaty Organization intelligence gathering activities in Western Europe and the degree of natural openness in the West, the Soviets probably do not need to rely on any

type of intrusive inspection measures. Beyond this, however, the Soviets retain a deep, almost automatic suspicion with respect to these types of measures. The idea of intrusive on-site inspections has been regarded uniformly as an excuse for Western spying. Nevertheless, the WTO reaction has been undercut somewhat because the NATO proposal linked the odious inspection measures with non-invasive Confidence-Building Measures similar to those included in the Helsinki Final Act. This linkage made it difficult for the Warsaw Treaty Organization negotiators to object too strenuously to the package of proposals. There has since been marginal agreement, at least in principle, on the idea of observers at exit and entry points during troop rotation. Agreement beyond this point is likely to be very difficult and the consideration of similar inspection measures at the CDE is almost certainly going to encounter similar difficulty.

The mix of different types of undertakings in the associated Measures package (especially intrusive inspection measures and information or pre-notification measures) illustrates one of the difficulties with the Confidence-Building-Measure concept. There has been a tendency to consider only the latter as being real CBMs. This is a consequence of thinking that the term Confidence-Building Measure applies only to those sorts of measures included in the Helsinki Final Act. The larger problem associated with this misconception is the inability to decide what else (if anything) should count as a Confidence-Building Measure. This is the same sort of problem that we encountered when we looked at a number of arms control agreements and treaties in Chapter Two. Which ones were CBMs and which ones weren't? Should CBM be a term used to describe virtually anything that makes people feel more comfortable about their potential adversaries? Should the term apply only to undertakings similar to the CSCE CBMs? Or should we use the term in a moderately restrictive fashion to describe a range of interstate undertakings designed to reduce the chance of and the opportunity for surprise attack? Without a clear-cut conception and defi-

