

tunities. Yet some of our contemporaries are mad enough to call this diffusing a knowledge of military life and discipline throughout the country. The course for the officers of the present force to pursue is to use all diligence to retain as many of their men as possible, gradually filling up their ranks with recruits, while pressure is put on the commercial interests and the employees of labor to compel them to encourage volunteering for their own sakes. As we have always upheld the active force as best adapted to the circumstances of Canada so are we satisfied that any change cannot fail being most injurious; it forms deservedly and effectively our first line of defence, as the regular militia (or ballotted men) must be the second. It has had severe trials in which every department short of the actual fighting force had to be improvised, and it passed successfully through them. Now, let us contrast all this with what we see with sincere regret occurring in England; here is a regular army of over 80,000 men, backed by treble that number of auxiliaries as Volunteers and Militia, costing for its commissariat (control) department alone £4,000,000 sterling, or one and a half times the whole revenue of Canada. It has been charged against its administration that it was defective and utterly unequal to the proper discharge of its duties while the organisation of the force is said to be utterly false in principle and impracticable in operation.

In order to test the value of its principal department the Minister at War, Mr. Cardwell, promised the House of Commons that 30,000 men should be moved a distance of some thirty or forty miles from their supplies and then manoeuvred in two bodies as in a campaign. Everything was prepared when it was suddenly discovered that the harvest was too late in Berkshire and, therefore, considerable damage would be done to the crops, and the Minister at War gravely stated to the House of Commons that the original project for a campaign in the New Forest was abandoned because of "*the quantities of flies which abounded in the summer months*," the real fact being that the commissariat (control) department had hopelessly broken down in the matter of transport in a county where half a million of horses could be obtained as stated by Lieut.-Colonel J. D. Shakespeare. Our readers will remember that in May, 1870, Canada placed 13,000 men with artillery on four points on her frontiers in forty-eight hours, the distance travelled in the average being over forty miles, and that without the slightest privation, in order to meet the exigencies of a real and treacherous attack. The value of the two organizations is at once apparent, one cumbrous, inefficient, liable to break down on the slightest emergency; the other, light, active, easily managed and able to concentrate or expand its energies to meet any contingency, perfectly capable of taking as high a position

as a disciplined force as the other, with far more intelligence in applying it. With an organization free from the curse of routine, and capable of indefinite extension, because it is voluntary, the country is asked to exchange this elasticity for a principle involving something very like what is at the bottom of all the troubles of the British army—the necessity for holding the soldier by compulsion to his colors.

It will be hardly necessary to put the alternative to the people of Canada; the system which has been tried should not be lightly abandoned for one whose value is at most merely theoretical and has never stood the test of practical application.

The following extract from an article in *Herepath's Journal* is worthy the serious consideration of the Canadian people, and although we differ from the writer as to the cause of the unexampled prosperity of this country, we give him all due credit for stating the case so fairly and ably. There are three greater agents to whose combined action the commercial prosperity of the Dominion, the establishment of her credit and the development of her resources are due. The abrogation of the Reciprocity Treaty by compelling our people to seek new channels of trade, by opening more profitable markets, stimulated commercial enterprise; the evidences of this are to be found in our marine, our foreign large trade and its rapidly increasing proportions since we became our own carriers. The confederation of the Provinces of British North America, by giving stability to our institutions, established our credit, while the organization of our military force added that necessary security which enabled it to be applied to the development of our resources, so that the British capitalist had no fear of investing his surplus in a country where there was not only good interest to be obtained—but the security of a whole armed population to defend it. Commercial writers, as a general rule, are apt to overlook this latter agent, but the experience of all history lays it down as a rigid rule that prosperity never yet attended on any people too feeble or foolish to defend their possessions, and that the first step to commercial success can only be taken when it is known that the traders will resort to the sword as readily as to the cloth-yard. The very conditions under which the Canadian military organization was effected contributed to the effect produced, a whole people enrolled and a large force embodied for active service at one-fourth the annual cost of the British Control Department on the peace establishment, and every test applied resulting in the proved excellence of the system. The advance of from fourteen to eighteen per cent in Canadian securities is ample proof of confidence, and in order to render its stability beyond doubt our people must bend their energies to the greater development of our military force, encouraging

every able-bodied man by precept and example to put in a term of service in the Volunteer force. A very little effort in the way of patriotism will save this country from those disgraceful scares known as *commercial panics*, for which no adequate reason has ever been assigned but that they arose from a feeling of *political insecurity*, real or imaginary, there can be no doubt. Unburdened with foreign complications Canada, by judiciously keeping up her military force, will be exempt from those terrible inflictions and justify *Herepath's* assertion as to her steady onward progress.

"The advance in Canadian Government stocks has been still more considerable. In April, 1865, Canadian 5 per cents might be had at from 82 to 84; now they make 100 to 101. Nova Scotia 6 per cents again, were purchasable at 93 to 96 in April, 1865, while now they are worth 104 to 105—we are referring to the bonds redeemable in 1875. New Brunswick sixes only commanded a quotation of 92 to 93 in April, 1864, while now they stand at 106 to 108. Are we not justified, in the presence of such facts as these, in asserting that Canada—the vast and steadily advancing Dominion of Canada—has acquired a far better position in the estimation of the world in May, 1871, than that which she occupied in April, 1864.

"So much for the improved credit of Canada. How has it been secured? Why, by a confederation of a number of straggling struggling States into one great Dominion, by a careful utilization of resources, and by a steady adoption of a judicious emigration policy. The great American war has also, perhaps, contributed in some measure to the prosperity of Canada by 'fixing' the United States with a large amount of taxation to meet the interest accruing on a heavy war debt. The financial position of the United States has so greatly improved that the pressure of taxation on the Americans is now decreasing, but in 1866, 1867, 1868 and 1869, Canada certainly appeared to great advantage when contrasted with the great republic in the matter of national and local burdens. Even now, too, in 1871, Canada may be said to be a country virtually without public debt, since the public lands of the Dominion might probably be found sufficient in a few years to extinguish its liabilities, if they were sold at a moderate price instead of been given away, as at present, to deserving emigrants. Meanwhile, Canada continues to grow daily in wealth, resources and appliances."

The most important and most expensive arm of a military force is artillery, and especially that portion of it prepared for service in the field. Its organization and disposition is one of the great problems with which the leaders of modern armies have to deal, while the rapid improvement in gunpowder, projectiles and cannon threatens at no distant day to compel a reconsideration of the place it should occupy in tactics. Apart from guns and ammunition its value in the field depends in a great measure on its power of rapid concentration, and this consideration has hitherto limited field batteries to light guns of small calibre. Recent experience seems to demand something more, and the movement appears to be in the direction of applying to modern