That case was an appeal from the Quebec courts, but the rule is stated generally on general principles.

Another Canadian case, *Blackburn* v. *McCallum*, 33 S.C.R. 65, is an authority on the same point. There the donee was not to sell or encumber the land for twenty-five years and it was held that, if generally the restraint would be invalid the limitation as to time did not make it good. Davies, J., said: "I cannot concur in the proposal that we should enlarge the exceptions to the general rule against restrictions upon alienations by the addition of one not at any rate judicially adopted in England and which would give validity to a restriction otherwise bad simply by binding the time during which it should work."

In *Hutt* v. *Hutt*, 24 O.L.R. 574, a restraint or alienation for the lifetime of another was held invalid. With these introductory remarks, we will examine what conditions are repugnant to the different estates.

An absolute prohibition against alienation is invalid. Many of the cases quoted, e.g., *In re Rocher, In re Dugdale*, etc., illustrate this. It seems, however, that it is permitted to limit partially the way in which the land may be disposed of. Littleton (page 223a) says that a condition not to alien "to such a one, naming his name, or to any of his heirs or of the issues of such a one, or the like, which conditions do not take away all power of alienation from the feoffee, then such condition is good." In *In re Macleay*, 20 Eq. 186, a condition limiting alienation to the testator's family was held to be valid, and then there is the still stronger case of *Doe* v. *Pearson*, 6 East 173, where it was held that if the devisees had no lawful issue the grantee could be restricted to alien to "her sister and sisters or their children." *In re Macleay* was criticized in *In re Rocher*, but was approved by Kay, J., in *Dugdale* v. *Dugdale*. The converse proposition also holds good and a donee cannot be forced to sell. In *In re Beetlestone* (1907), L.T.R. 367, there was an absolute gift, but if not disposed of within the lifetime of the donee there was a gift over. This was invalid. In *Shaw* v. *Ford*, 7 Ch. D. 669, A., B. and C. were to be tenants in common in fee with a gift over on their de-