it behind the chair to some other place which would be more convenient, and make room for other customers who had come in. The plaintiff demurred to that being done, but the request was repeated, and then he allowed his coat to be moved. The defendant's wife hung the coat up, but afterwards it could not be found. It had been stolen, and the plaintiff therefore asked to be recompensed for the loss he had sustained. The question turned on the relationship existing between the plaintiff and the defendant, and whether they stood in the position of guest and innkeeper. The defendant's solicitor said the defendant's establishment was a restaurant. On the question of law the defendant could not possibly be held liable for the loss of the plaintiff's overcoat. His honor said the plaintiff did not go as guest to an innkeeper. He went for his lunch, and that was all the difference. The law gave the plaintiff no remedy for the loss he had suffered. There must be judgment for the defendant, with costs. The above decision is rather incomprehensible. It certainly could not be sustained under our law, and we may refer to the analogous case of *Bunnell* v. *Stern*, before the New York Court of Appeals, to show that in New York State a different conclusion was arrived at. In *Bunnell* v. *Stern* a customer took off her wrap in a shop in order to try on a cloak, and it was held that the shopkeeper was responsible for the wrap. The court remarked: "Under the circumstances, we think it became the defendants' duty to exercise some care for the plaintiff's cloak, because she had laid it aside upon their invitation, and with their knowledge, and without question or notice from them, had put it in the only place that she could (on the counter)." The above appears in the Montreal *Legal News* for August 29th. We feel that it is incumbent upon us to congratulate our contemporary on its enterprise in noting a decision of an English court three days before the case was even tried. As it is improbable that the report came by cable, the feat is all the more remarkable.

JUDICIAL NEPOTISM.—On the subject of judicial nepotism, a contributor writes to the *Law Times*: "In Ireland the late Sir Michael O'Loghlen, who held the office of Master of the Rolls, absolutely forced his son (afterwards Sir Colman O'Loghlen, Q.C., M.P.) to practise before him. Sir Michael O'Loghlen, when at the Irish Bar in the earlier decades of the present century, had some experience of the great scandal entailed by such a system in the administration of justice. When Mr. O'Grady, Chief Baron of the Irish Court of Exchequer, and afterwards Viscount Guillamore, was on the bench, his son specialised his father's court. A brief to move a motion of course in the Exchequer was sent to a Mr. Cooper, afterwards one of the Benchers of the Irish Bar. The motion was refused by the Chief Baron, whereupon Mr. Cooper returned brief and fee to the solicitor with the request that he should send them to Mr. O'Grady, who next morning moved the motion, which was immediately granted by his father, the Lord Chief Baron. 'Why, my Lord,' said Mr. Cooper, who was in court, 'your Lordship refused to grant this motion when I moved it yesterday morning?' 'But, Mr. Cooper,' said the Chief Baron unabashed, 'you must admit