of the House of Commons, Sir James Mansfield prescribed another test of punishable insanity—namely, whether the accused possessed sufficient capacity to distinguish between right and wrong in the abstract. In the course of time this theory of responsibility also was felt to be inadequate. Scientific observers of the phenomena of mental disease established the existence of a type of lunatic whose general notions of right and wrong were perfectly clear and correct, and who nevertheless committed acts forbidden alike by morality and by law, under a fixed belief that his conduct was not only pardonable but meritorious. It might well be that such persons deserved punishment. But it was certain that the existing law offered little guidance as to the principles on which their punishment should be based. This deficiency the present legal test of lunacy purports to supply. It is embodied in answers given by the judges to questions propounded to them by the House of Lords after the acquittal of Daniel Macnaughton, in 1843, on the charge of having murdered Mr. Drummond, the private secretary of Sir Robert Peel; and it makes the guilt or innocence of a person accused of a crime, and defended on the ground of insanity, depend on whether he did or did not "know the nature and quality" of his act at the time of committing it. Against this standard of responsibility the British Medical Association is now in full tilt, and not without reason. The "rules in *Macnaughton's Case*" represent accurately enough the state of medical knowledge in 1843, and are still comparatively harmless when judiciously manipulated. But they ignore the fact that mental disease may, and does, impair its victims' wills, as well as their other faculties; and, after the criticisms that have been passed upon them by judges so eminent as the late Lord Coleridge, the late Sir James Stephen, and Sir Henry Hawkins, it is high time they were revised. We regard, however, with considerable apprehension the proposal that the revision should take the form of questions put to the judges by the House of Lords. We should have thought that this species of catechism had already been sufficiently discredited by the experiment of 1843; and we know of no other authority for the proposition that the House of Lords has a right to question the judges except in the exercise of its legislative or judicial functions. What is wanted is that some barrister should be found of sufficient daring to challenge the authority of the Macnaughton "rules" in defending a prisoner on whose behalf a plea of insan-