

6. Turning to the UN, Mr. Ikeda expressed gratification at continued Japanese-Canadian cooperation in the General Assembly. Mr. Diefenbaker agreed that it had been beneficial, particularly with regard to sponsorship of the resolution on nuclear testing.

[W.F.] BULL

803.

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*L'ambassadeur au Japon  
au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures*

*Ambassador in Japan  
to Secretary of State for External Affairs*

TELEGRAM 428

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PRIME MINISTER'S VISIT TO JAPAN –  
DISCUSSION WITH PRIME MINISTER IKEDA (OCTOBER 28)

Mr. Diefenbaker had a discussion meeting with Mr. Ikeda on October 28. Mr. Ikeda was accompanied by Foreign Minister Kosaka and Ambassador Ushiba. With Mr. Diefenbaker were Ambassador Bull and officials.

2. Mr. Ikeda said he was interested in Mr. Diefenbaker's thinking on: (1) Berlin and Germany; (2) Britain and the Common Market; (3) Japan's desire to join OECD.

3. *Berlin and Germany.* Mr. Diefenbaker said Canada believed in negotiation of the differences between East and West on this question. It was important to define what was not repeat not negotiable and what might be negotiable. The West could not repeat not negotiate on the right of unhampered ingress and egress into Berlin. The West could not repeat not tolerate interference with the right of the people of Berlin to live as they wished. He pointed out that Berlin is primarily the responsibility of the Three Western Powers with troops there, but that Canada too has a responsibility as a member of NATO. Coupled with that responsibility was the right of consultation, and this meant the right to place our views before the other NATO powers and the right to have those views fully considered.

4. As to what might be negotiable, Mr. Diefenbaker said that if the USSR entered into a separate peace treaty with East Germany, that was their business. The consequences of that action, however, would be of major importance. Too great an issue should not repeat not be made over the identity of the nation whose representatives signed the entry cards, but interference with free entry to West Berlin would be a different matter.

5. Mr. Ikeda asked if the main point was that the rights Mr. Diefenbaker had mentioned would be defended. Mr. Diefenbaker agreed, and said that if we gave way on those points we would have lost something important above all else – it would be apparent that we had betrayed the trust of those to whom we had given our pledged word.

6. Mr. Ikeda asked about Canada's attitude on nuclear weapons for West Germany. Mr. Diefenbaker said Canadian policy on nuclear weapons remained as he had defined it in February 1959. Even though the Bomarc sites in Canada would be more effective if the weapons had nuclear warheads, Canada would not repeat not accept nuclear weapons unless the USA were to alter the statutory prohibition that now exists and give Canada a joint right of control, absolute in its effect. As for nuclear weapons in Europe, Mr. Diefenbaker said only that there should be a high degree of NATO control.