

the necessity for gradually raising the bight at different points and buoying it until sufficient slack is obtained to bring it to the surface. A ship dragging for a cable for the purpose of cutting it only would not be hampered by any such considerations, and the grapnel used would be so constructed as to cut the cable directly it was caught. Then again, the destruction of the cables would undoubtedly tell against us far more than against any enemy at sea. Another matter which would affect most seriously British trade, is the power to keep open the Suez Canal. Upon this point also opinion seems to be divided, though a large majority of those whose opinions I have been able to gather think that it would be impossible to keep it open. One speaker described what occurred at Port Said, when, from the grounding of a ship in the canal, it became blocked for 24 hours. He said that the next morning there had arisen in the harbour at Port Said a perfect forest of funnels, and there was hardly standing room, so to speak, inside. The speaker, H. S. H. Prince Louis of Battenberg, says: "I take it, the canal would be effectually blocked at the outset, probably before war was actually declared." This becomes all the more important when we remember that, for the purposes of British trade, the Suez Canal commences at Gibraltar and ends at Aden. The traffic with the East, which would thus be completely obstructed in its usual channel, would be diverted either to the Cape or trans-Canadian route, and this alone should make Canadians anxious to see that every effort possible should be made to render the latter route secure. After reading the various discussions which have taken place between eminent naval authorities as to the methods which could be adopted to protect our merchant vessels, and the means at hand wherewith to protect them, one is forced to the conclusion that unless Great Britain so effectually crushed her enemies at sea at the outset, and so crippled their fighting fleets as to set a large part of the British fleet free to be employed for the purposes of commerce protection, Great Britain has not, nor under the present system does it seem possible that she can have, a sufficient number of armed cruisers, over and above what would be required for scouting purposes in connection with the fighting line of battle, to adequately protect our trade routes. In fact, in a recent discussion which took place in the theatre of the R. U. S. L., this proposition was assumed at the commencement and its correctness was not denied by any of the distinguished naval officers present. And would it not obviously be the tactics of any of England's possible enemies in the first place to engage the attention of her whole fleet in keeping the enemies' line of battle blockaded in its own ports, so that their commerce destroyers might have the best possible chance of attacking Britain in her most vulnerable point in all parts of the world. Admiral Nicholson, who had given this subject a great deal of thought, says in this connec-