

weapon. The Hon. Member is correct, it would be a 1,000-pound warhead, but a 1,000-pound warhead is not capable of doing what he says it is capable of doing. It is only a nuclear weapon with 17 times the power of the Hiroshima bomb.

• (1630)

Mr. Forrestall: Mr. Speaker, the last time I used a sledge hammer to crack a peanut I did not have anything left. You do not need a nuclear weapon to blow up a runway or render it less than useful to an enemy! You need only modern explosives.

Rather than get into a debate and take up the time of the House, Mr. Speaker, I suggest that my hon. friend use the influence of the Minister of National Defence (Mr. Lamontagne) and others in the Government to get himself into a United States explosives factory and get himself a first-class briefing on just exactly what we can do with modern explosives. Then he will understand that no man in his right mind would drop an atomic bomb on a radio station. What in hell for? What is this debate about? To kill innocent, harmless people? It is crazy, insane and nobody would do it. Not even Moscow would do it and they have the equivalent capability. If the Hon. Member is not aware of that, perhaps he had better do a little bit of reading.

Mr. Stanley Hudecki (Parliamentary Secretary to Minister of National Defence): Mr. Speaker, I would like to open my remarks by commenting on the role of the Department of National Defence. The role is a very specific one. It is the protection of this bountiful land of ours against aggression and the preservation of peace and freedom. It must do this in the real world where there are foreign powers who do not share our values of freedom and dignity for each human being. Peace has different meanings and perceptions in different lands. For example, the Soviet Union's definition, as expressed by Lenin many years ago, was that peace simply means communist world control.

In this world, nuclear weapons do exist. We cannot wish them away or demonstrate them away. They will not go away. They exist as weapons in the hands of sovereign states, friend or foe alike, such as the Soviet Union, the People's Republic of China, the United Kingdom, and most likely other countries as well. Indeed, these terrible weapons are in the hands of nations whose leadership is dedicated to the very antithesis of democracy and freedom. One such superpower is the Soviet Union.

A nuclear weapon is not just a qualitative advance over previous weapons. They have added a new dimension, not only to warfare but to our very human existence. There can be no winners in a nuclear war, but nuclear arms are a reality that we must face as a nation and address as a Defence Department.

In light of its size and geography, its vast and unpopulated frontiers, its three ocean coastlines and its wide expanse of ice and snow in the north, Canada relies heavily on its alliance with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and operates under an allied defence system. There is no doubt but that Canada's security depends on co-operation with our neighbour to the south as well as with our other partners in NATO. The

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motion today deals with our participation in NATO concerning deterrence, which is interpreted as an escalation in nuclear arms.

In the first place, the House is asked to oppose escalation of the nuclear arms race by any nation. Inherent in this proposition are two implications: the first is that there is in progress a "nuclear arms race". The second is that the pace of this arms race is quickening in that its dimensions are getting larger; that it is indeed escalating.

Historically the concept of an arms race has been applied to a situation in which potential military rivals or adversaries have engaged in competitive programs of armament or rearmament, each with the objective of gaining superiority over the other. Is this in fact the process in which, with respect to their nuclear arsenals, the two superpowers and, more generally, NATO and the Warsaw Pact are now engaged? If so, Mr. Speaker, if we conclude that the two rival superpowers on the one hand and NATO and the Warsaw Pact on the other hand are indeed engaged in a race for superiority in nuclear weapons, do we not then have to examine how that race was started and what are its current dynamics before we can reach sensible conclusions as to how it can best be halted and as to the effects upon the arms race of particular weapon decisions taken by either? As the Minister said in his statement on Estimates to the Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence on March 15:

For two decades the Soviet Union has had the potential to threaten Western Europe with intermediate-range ballistic missiles armed with nuclear weapons, without there ever having been a large number of similar systems available in the allied military structure of NATO Europe. NATO was able to tolerate this situation as long as the United States enjoyed a superiority in intercontinental ballistic missiles which kept not only the Soviet Union's counterparts, but also its land-based Intermediate-Range Nuclear Force (INF) missiles facing Europe in rough balance. Since the Soviet Union has become equally strong in intercontinental weapons, and since this rough strategic parity has been codified by the SALT agreements, there is now a greater need to correct the pronounced imbalance in intermediate-range weapons, either through a reduction by the Soviet Union or by the installation of some offsetting system by the West. In the area of intermediate-range weapons, the Soviet Union made a great and deliberate leap forward with the introduction of SS-20 missiles. The North Atlantic Alliance members were understandably concerned by this new threat to the territory of its European states.

When early efforts to dissuade the Soviet Union from deploying its SS-20s failed, Western governments took the 'two-track' decision in December 1979 to modernize NATO's intermediate-range weapons through the introduction of the Pershing II and Ground Launched Cruise Missile (GLCM) and to offer arms control negotiations to the Soviet Union, an unprecedented procedure in which negotiations were proposed on new weapons systems before their deployment and whose objective it is to bring about a limitation of these systems in both East and West at the lowest possible level, desirably zero. Canada is convinced, as are her European allies, that the threat posed by the presence of the Soviet Union's long-range land-based INF missiles cannot be ignored. Though we greatly prefer to deal with this threat through negotiations, we also recognize and support the requirement for NATO to negotiate from a position of strength."

The lesson of history is that peace is made more likely by a balance of power; so long as East and West maintain broadly equivalent forces, there is little danger of war. But the West can only sustain its part of this relationship if its own forces are kept up to date. There is also a need to guard against