Although in most cases writs of error and motions to set aside could be entertained in cases of this nature, if any error of informality were apparent on the face of the proceedings, outlawry could be of no effect. In the Province of Manitoba there could be no outlawry. In the first place, there were no sheriffs of counties, for there was but one sheriff, and in the second place, there were no coroners of counties, for there was only one coroner. As these first instruments to outlawry did not exist according to the law, the means of taking the course dictated by the law of England did not exist, and that course could not therefore be taken. The form of proceeding was a peculiar one, but it was required to be carried out with the strictest possible exactitude. The result of carrying out these proceedings in England was that, if the man did not appear within the time stated, and judgment of outlawry were pronounced, he might be executed without any further proceeding. Therefore it was that the law was so particularly observed as in favor of life, and matters which under ordinary circumstances would be looked upon as mere irregularities were in this regard treated by the law as defects. Outlawries had over and over again been reversed upon grounds which in other cases would be of no force at all. For the reasons stated, therefore, no judgment of outlawry could have existed in the case of RIEL at all. In reference to the record before the House, the difficulties that might occur, and did occur in many cases in England, appeared to be multiplied tenfold. He thought it would be almost impossible to produce any record of outlawry with so many mistakes in it as there were in this. There were no less than ten or a dozen grounds, upon the face of the record, why judgment should be reversed. There was one ground, at least, upon which not only could no legal man, but also no layman in the House, fail to see that the outlawry was null and void. The *quinto exactus* was the 10th February, the 10th of this present month, and that was the very day upon which RIEL was required to appear in Court. He had the whole of that day in which to appear, and therefore he could not be outlawed by any possibility until the next day. Yet on the very face of this proceeding it appeared that he was outlawed on the day he was required to appear. The case on that point was as clear as it could be, and the authorities as plain. In a case where an offender was outlawed on the day of the *quinto exactus*, the outlawry was set aside because he had all that day in which to appear before the Court, and by no possibility could he be outlawed until the following day. The cases reported in COKE JAMES, 160, and PALMER, 280, were clear upon this point, and the reason of the thing was quite as evident as the law; because if a man had the whole of the 10th of February to appear, it was quite clear that he could not be outlawed on that day. And yet the record upon which the House was called upon to act declared that LOUIS RIEL was an outlaw on the 10th of February, and was certified to by the Clerk of the Court of Queen's Bench on that day—the day before RIEL could possibly have became an outlaw. In addition to that point there were other objections which might be taken, and which would on the face of the record be sufficient to void the sentence of outlawry. For instance: the statute which the sheriff professed to follow was the 31 ELIZABETH, and that statute declared that there should be no outlawry unless three proclamations were issued, the first in the County Court, the second in the Quarter Sessions, and the third at the door of the parish church of the place where the party lived, one month before the outlawry. But on the face of the record in this case it appeared that the first and third proclamations took place on the same day, 4th January, and the second immediately afterwards, and not at the Quarter Sessions, but at the County Court. So that the very statute that had professedly been acted upon had not been acted upon. This was not his own reasoning merely, for he had authorities, and could give an adjudged case for every point he took. Moreover, it could not be controverted that one month must elapse between the issues of the five proclamations in the County Courts required by law. What time had been allowed to elapse in this case? The first proclamation was issued on the 4th of January, 1875, in the County of Selkirk; the second on the 7th of January, in the County of Lisgar; the third on the 11th January, in the County of Provencher; and the fourth on the 13th January, in