

that of the international community. The Soviet leaders do not. They can even insulate domestic opinion from international opprobrium. For example, when the U.S.S.R. suffered a crushing defeat in the United Nations General Assembly vote on Afghanistan, the Soviet government saw to it that this news was never reported in the Soviet Union. But if ours is the more difficult kind of society to govern, it is also in the long run stronger and more enduring, when it is supported by a widespread national determination based on deeply held conviction.

Alliance
message

Last December we agreed on the need to convince our publics that the alliance's 1979 two-track decision was the necessary answer to the threat stemming from the build-up of Soviet nuclear forces in Europe. We saw that the peace movement had to be persuaded that the real campaign for nuclear disarmament must be waged not in the streets but at the bargaining table. We have had some success — and in this context I commend the international staff and the national delegations for their preparation of the NATO and the Warsaw Pact Force Comparison Paper — but we have hardly yet begun our efforts. In particular our publics must be constantly reminded that arms control forms an essential component of alliance security policy. Otherwise what is now a relatively small minority will continue to win converts to their "enough-is-enough" argument and to such simplistic solutions as a freeze and non-first use of nuclear weapons.

The argument that there are already sufficient weapons to destroy civilization many times over and, therefore, that all systems should be frozen at their present levels is deceptively attractive, and easily communicated to the uninformed. So is the apparently reasonable proposition that both sides should pledge not to use nuclear weapons first. Ours is a more complex message so we must exercise greater skill in communicating it.

Our message must be that the Atlantic alliance is dedicated to preserving peace, to renouncing the use of force to settle disputes, and to making the world a safer place. We must make it clear that for the West to accept "quick-fix" solutions, unilateral disarmament or any type of weapons freeze that perpetuates a superiority for the Warsaw Pact would more likely increase the risk of conflict than reduce it, and would leave us open to the danger of Soviet intimidation. Our message must also be that we are against the first use of force. Hostilities once begun create their own destructive and uncontrollable momentum.

Two-track
NATO
security policy

NATO security policy, proven successful for more than 30 years, is to maintain a combination of conventional and nuclear forces at the level necessary to demonstrate that aggression in the NATO area would not pay. But this is not all. A further component of our policy is that we are also committed to reduce through realistic, balance and verifiable agreements the level of both NATO and Warsaw Pact forces. Defence and deterrence on the one hand, and arms control and disarmament on the other, are two sides of the same security coin. They cannot be safely separated.
