

some of which have been described above but the most important of which is the opportunity to assist both states in developing safe, reliable and internationally-verifiable nuclear power systems and distribution networks. The risks of further proliferation, given that both countries already possess second-generation nuclear weapons technology, are comparatively low. Nuclear power and industrial assistance should be considered as initiatives to be explored.

Arms Control

The domain of arms control offers a wide array of potential initiatives for the international community to explore and exploit, ranging from inexpensive to costly, short- to long-term, narrow- to broadly-based and benign to risky. Among the most promising are encouraging both India and Pakistan to voluntarily observe the NPT and CTBT in principle, the establishment of technical CSBMs, brokering an effective and verifiable fissile materials cut-off treaty (FMCT), implementing effective export controls, and reinforcing stability by granting both New Delhi and Islamabad access to real-time data from Western defence support and surveillance systems. The first crosses the line between diplomatic and arms control initiatives, but represents a relatively minor concession by both governments, and one which in any case could not be formalized without modifying the NPT – a process rendered, by the drafters, sufficiently complex so as to virtually prohibit any substantive changes.²¹ However, voluntary adherence to the strictures of existing arms control agreements would be a small but important first step that would allow the international community to "get the ball rolling" in the region while at the same time allowing both New Delhi and Islamabad to demonstrate their good faith. We saw examples of this in the Argentine-Brazilian case.

Assistance with CSBMs and early warning are more concrete and would require considerable assistance and flexibility on the part of the United States. Washington would in all probability be more than willing to assist in offering technical CSBM assistance in the areas of ground-based surveillance, early warning and communications systems, but would likely be considerably more reticent to allow either actor access to missile early warning data. The impact on regional stability of such assistance, however, would be major, and would offer a key incentive to India and Pakistan to back away from confrontation and eschew nuclear brinkmanship.

Another potentially valuable arms control initiative would be the establishment of a joint exchange and verification mechanism. This would have to be brokered by a third party, and preferably by one which is not one of the "Permanent Five", a factor not applicable in the Argentine-Brazilian situation. An agreement along the lines of "Open Skies" could be concluded between India and Pakistan, with a ground-based challenge and inspection regime designed to allow short-notice access to nuclear design, development, construction and storage facilities. This measure, although complex in both design and execution, would be relatively inexpensive and would serve to further

²¹ The NPT, in essence, was designed to be impossible to amend in any realistic sense, thus one attempted to render illegitimate ante-facto the efforts of a sixth or subsequent nation to become a member of the nuclear club.