

basic realization that security awareness, increased competency, and level headedness are vital for the success of humanitarian operations.

To serve this marketplace, many PSCs either currently hold contracts with humanitarian organizations or have the capacity to provide the requisite services. While some of the training services are inappropriate for humanitarian operations (anti-industrial espionage, sharpshooting, and "getaway" driving to name but a few), many providers have developed product lines sensitive to the needs and operating conditions of humanitarians. Training offered deals with such diverse yet crucially important aspects as threat assessment, information management, contingency planning, and convoy and emergency vehicle operations. DSL, for one, provides a variety of security analyses, audits, and training for a number of humanitarian clients: CARE, Caritas, USAID, and United Nations bodies are some examples. These services supplied by DSL and its competitors do not entail the "hardening" of humanitarian organizations as feared by many organizations, but instead deal with the ad hocism that plagues many humanitarians' approach towards security.

"Hardening", however, is possible through the protection of humanitarian compounds and personnel. These guarding services are similar to those offered by commercial security to embassies, military bases, corporations, and mining operations around the world. While most PSCs have foreign nationals in the managerial positions in the field, local recruitment is key. The ratio of foreign nationals to local employees is determined by such factors as level of risk, the size of the contract, the wishes of the client, and whether or not training of the local workforce is required.<sup>15</sup> One company, the recently closed Lifeguard, employed nationals from South Africa, the United Kingdom, and the United States, but operated predominantly in Sierra Leone. In its operations, which included providing guards for diamond mines and the United Nations and World Vision missions in Freetown, the ratio was anywhere from three to fifteen local employees to every foreign national. Similar operations performed by DSL for seven different United Nations humanitarian clients in Afghanistan, Rwanda, Somalia, Sudan, and Tanzania also rely on local recruitment to varying degrees.

The "hardest" service, of course, is active military assistance that would provide the general stability in which humanitarians could work unmolested. Some PSCs operate as "force multipliers" in that not only do they provide military assistance in terms of procurement strategies and training to local state-led forces, but they also participate directly in combat on the behalf of their employer. Indeed, the operations of the now defunct Executive Outcomes (EO) in Sierra Leone (1995-1997) and Angola (1993-1995) and of Sandline International in Sierra Leone (1998) have been credited by local civilians and humanitarians alike for the relative stability their presence brought. Ian Douglas, a former Brigadier-General in the Canadian Armed Forces and later a security advisor to various United Nations operations in Africa, comments in the context of Sierra Leone that "EO gave us this stability. In a perfect world, of course, we wouldn't need an organization like EO, but I'd be loath to say that they have to go just because they are mercenaries".<sup>16</sup> As will be discussed below, given the connection with the non-state use of

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<sup>15</sup> Interview, Bernie McCabe, Director, Lifeguard, 10 April 2000.

<sup>16</sup> Cited in Herbert M. Howe, "Private security forces and African stability: the case of Executive