In all cases where power over the entire structure is vested in a U.S. body, Canada has virtually no control over what takes place on the Canadian half of the bridge. In effect, this problem would only be solved by the re-creation of a Canadian bridge entity, and since the amalgamation of the Canadian and U.S. companies was in most cases authorized by legislation, this could only be reversed by legislation. Where there is a reversionary clause, control over the Canadian half of the bridge will ultimately be returned to Canada and the problem would thus be solved. However, in most cases this is many years away, and the only alternative to amending legislation would appear to be some form of accelerated reversion.

3. Merger of the U.S. bridge authority with some other body having purely U.S. interests and possible use of bridge revenues for non-bridge purposes.

Examples of this are the Thousand Islands, Prescott-Ogdensburg and Peace Bridges, where the bridge authorities have become associated or merged with larger authorities controlling airport and harbour facilities. This problem is mainly significant in relation to the payment of income tax on revenue earned in Canada, since it becomes extremely difficult to identify the revenue in that category when the accounting is handled exclusively on the U.S. side. Obviously, the U.S. Government has an absolute right to permit such joint operations with regard to the U.S. half of each bridge but the mere existence of such joint operations must preclude any sort of bi-national authority as originally envisaged in the guidelines.

4. Uncertainty about terms of reversion.

Except in the case of the Ambassador Bridge, and bridges already under government ownership, the reversionary principle applies to all Ontario international bridges in one form or another, and reversion is usually scheduled to take