

A sequence of leaks and public statements in early October 1985 revealed the outlines of the Soviet proposal even though all the details were not made public. The information cited below is based on the general references to the proposal in speeches by Mikhail Gorbachev, and on comments attributed to Marshall Akhromeyov, Chief of the Soviet General Staff.<sup>27</sup> The speech by Secretary Gorbachev on January 15th 1986, with subsequent clarifications, affects the earlier proposal specifically only in regard to the European-based systems. Insofar as these changes are relevant, they are noted below.

Although the terms have differed somewhat from one source to another, the main outline appears to be as follows:

- a 50% cut in strategic launchers on both sides
- a cut in warheads such that both sides will retain 6000
- a sub-ceiling of 60% of strategic warheads (3600) in any single leg of the triad
- a ban on SDI research and development
- a definition of 'strategic' (launchers which can hit the homeland of the other) which includes the long-range theatre nuclear forces (LRTNF) of the United States but not those of the Soviet Union (since the latter cannot normally reach the United States)
- a ban on modernization possibly so defined for negotiating purposes as to allow the Soviets to continue deployments of SS-24 and SS-25 ICBMs, and the SS-N-20 SLBM, but which might not allow any of the following American systems: the MX, the Midgetman, the Trident D-5, the advanced technology (Stealth) bomber
- a ban on long-range cruise missiles (over 600 kilometers) which would prevent both the present deployments on both sides of the long-range ALCMs and the further development of the advanced cruise missile (ACM), as well, presumably, as sea-launched cruise missiles.

In the following analysis we by-pass two of the most critical of these

<sup>27</sup> "Soviet Official's Response to Arms Questions" New York Times October 18, 1985, p. 14