$$q_{1}^{*} \cdot (-b_{1} + (b_{1} + d_{1})\beta_{1}(\varepsilon_{1}^{*})) + q_{2}^{*} \cdot (-b_{2} + (b_{2} + d_{2})\beta_{2}(\varepsilon - \varepsilon_{1}^{*}))$$

$$\geq q_{1} \cdot (-b_{1} + (b_{1} + d_{1})\beta_{1}(\varepsilon_{1}^{*})) + q_{2} \cdot (-b_{2}(b_{2} + d_{2})\beta_{2}(\varepsilon - \varepsilon_{1}^{*}))$$
(3.43)

for all q_1 , q_2 and that $q_1 + q_2 \le 1$. The second inequality is satisfied by ε_1^* as defined by (3.33); it exists because of (3.31) and (3.32). Furthermore, using (3.34) and dividing both sides by $G_1 \cdot G_2/(G_1 + G_2)$ shows that the first inequality is equivalent to

$$\frac{1-\beta_{1}(\varepsilon_{1}^{*})}{(1-\beta_{1}(\varepsilon_{1}^{*}))'} - \frac{1-\beta_{1}(\varepsilon-\varepsilon_{1}^{*})}{(1-\beta_{2}(\varepsilon-\varepsilon_{1}^{*}))'}$$

$$\geq \int_{0}^{\varepsilon} \left[\frac{1-\beta_{1}(\varepsilon_{1})}{(1-\beta_{1}(\varepsilon_{1}^{*}))'} - \frac{1-\beta_{2}(\varepsilon-\varepsilon_{1})}{(1-\beta_{2}(\varepsilon-\varepsilon_{1}^{*}))'} \right] dF(\varepsilon_{1})$$

for all F. Now, because of (3.26), the function

$$H(\varepsilon_1) = \frac{1 - \beta_1(\varepsilon_1)}{(1 - \beta_1(\varepsilon_1^*))'} - \frac{1 - \beta_2(\varepsilon - \varepsilon_1)}{(1 - \beta_2(\varepsilon - \varepsilon_2^*))'} \text{ for } 0 \le \varepsilon_1 \le \varepsilon_1$$

is strictly concave in ε_1 for $0 \le \varepsilon_1 \le \varepsilon$, and satisfies

$$\frac{dH(\varepsilon_1)}{d\varepsilon_1}\bigg|_{\varepsilon_1=\varepsilon_1^*}=0.$$

Therefore, this inequality is fulfilled for all distributions F. If (3.38) holds, then it can be shown immediately that the solution (3.39) satisfies the Nash conditions.

Consider now the general problem of guarenteeing legal behaviour of the state in equilibrium, i.e., $q_1^* = q_2^* = 0$. Whereas the Nash condition (3.6) is identically fulfilled, (3.7) is given by

$$0 \ge \int_{0}^{\varepsilon} [q_1 \cdot (-b_1 + (b_1 + d_1)\beta_1(\varepsilon_1)) + q_2 \cdot (-b_2 + (b_2 + d_2)\beta_2(\varepsilon - \varepsilon_1))] dF^*(\varepsilon_1) \quad (3.44)$$

for all q_1, q_2 such that $q_1 + q_2 \le 1$, where F^* is the equilibrium distribution of the IAEA's inspection effort. Now (3.44) is equivalent to

$$0 \ge q_1 \cdot \left[-b_1 + (b_1 + d_1) \cdot \int_0^{\varepsilon} \beta_1(\varepsilon_1) dF^*(\varepsilon_1) \right] + q_2 \cdot \left[-b_2 + (b_2 + d_2) \cdot \int_0^{\varepsilon} \beta_2(\varepsilon - \varepsilon_1) dF^*(\varepsilon_1) \right]$$

for all q_1, q_2 with $q_1 + q_2 \le 1$. This is true if and only if

A14.

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