(Mr. Lowitz, United States)

contributing to a transition to a so-called "first-strike psychology" and it was claimed that the strategic defence initiative would result in the replacement of strategic stability with strategic chaos.

At the same time, one might conclude from the Soviet statements that their activities in the area of strategic forces development — activities that have been in progress for many years — do not raise significant concerns to the United States about the viability of strategic stability. Such a conclusion would of course be incorrect. In fact, only the Soviet Union today possesses a force of intercontinental ballistic missiles with a combination of yield and accuracy sufficient to attack and destroy hardened military facilities that are key elements of nuclear deterrence. The United States does not have a comparable hard-target offensive capability. Only the Soviet Union has mobile missiles with multiple warheads of intercontinental range. And only the Soviet Union has a fully tested and deployed anti-satellite system.

Moreover, since 1979 the Soviet Union has deployed at least three new types of intercontinental ballistic missiles, eight improved versions of existing ICBMs and submarine-launched ballistic missiles, and long-range cruise missiles. Eight thousand strategic warheads have been added to the nuclear forces of the Soviet Union since 1969, when the SALT I negotiations began, 4,000 of which have been added since 1979 when the SALT II treaty was signed.

It is therefore difficult to understand the concern which we have heard expressed, when these developments have continued without pause, and when in the strategic arms reduction talks the United States still awaits a response from the Soviet Union to its proposals, proposals designed not to destabilize but to strengthen strategic stability.

One might further conclude from the statements of the Soviet Union that it has no programmes comparable to the United States strategic defence initiative. This conclusion, too, would be incorrect.

I addressed a number of these matters last year in my statement of 19 March. I regret the necessity to return to them, but it is important to try again to set at least part of the record straight. First, the Soviet Union is heavily involved in strategic defence, with programmes that go well beyond research. In fact, over the last two decades, the Soviet Union has spent roughly as much on strategic defence as it has on its offensive nuclear forces. As one example of this very large effort, the Soviet Union has deployed around Moscow the world's only operational anti-ballistic missile system. The United States is concerned that, in the aggregate, Soviet ABM-related activities could provide the basis for deployment of an ABM defence of their national territory, a deployment which would violate the ABM treaty.

The Soviet Union also has an in-depth national air defence force, an extensive political leadership survival programme, and nationwide civil defence forces and programmes. Soviet strategic defence programmes, moreover, are not restricted to the more traditional approaches. Since the 1960s the USSR has also been pursuing research on advanced technologies for strategic defence. These technologies include those for high-energy lasers, particle