

als can also find application in the strategic nuclear realm. Several proposals have already suggested the use of tamper-proof "black boxes" in ICBM fields that would provide prompt warning of launches through secure communications. Similar arrangements at known long-range bomber bases could be proposed as well.

4. **Mobile Inspection Measures.** A number of Confidence-Building proposals have included the provision for some variety of mobile inspection team. The underlying theme in this group of proposals is the irregular use of observers (with or without extensive electromechanical aids) to inspect facilities or activities that have become special objects of concern. These types of Inspection Measures differ from those already mentioned in that they envision the *reactive* use of inspectors to investigate presumably ambiguous or unintentionally obscured activities that could be construed as being dangerous. More often than not, such activities would concern restricted equipment or the placement of offensive capabilities. The measures mentioned in previous sections are more rigid and involve the placement of observers in anticipation of certain events. The types of mobile inspection teams envisioned in various proposals range from small units operating in Jeeps to much more elaborate arrangements involving fixed-wing or helicopter inspections. Some proposals suggest that participant states be permitted a fixed number of "free" inspections of questionable facilities or activities. The intention in these cases is to discourage nuisance inspections or persistent "fishing trips" whose purpose is simply to collect as much intelligence as possible. Other proposals have suggested the use of specially constituted inspection teams – neutral or United Nations personnel for instance – in order to minimize both the perceived intrusiveness of inspections and any incidental intelligence benefits resulting from inspection trips. One proposal has even suggested that a host country might want to rely upon a neutral observer team to verify, on the request of the host state, that particular activities were not preparations for war. These

Mobile Inspection Measures are usefully applicable in virtually any part of the world, from Central Europe, through the Middle East and Africa to Central and South America. They could also be used in special regions where demilitarization regimes operate, such as the Antarctic and outer space. The primary purpose of intrusive Inspection Measures is to reduce concerns about surprise attack and, secondarily, to confirm adherence to agreements. As is the case with other Confidence-Building Measures – perhaps even more so – confidence and trust are built predominantly by the fact that participant states willingly subscribe to the measures. Obviously, the use of mobile inspection teams is extremely intrusive and, even with appropriate limitations on their freedom of movement and activity, their acceptance would represent a remarkable revision in the national security perspectives of virtually all states.

Inspection Measures, because they are intrusive, are almost certainly going to be difficult to negotiate. Their intrusiveness varies (relatively little for fixed site electromechanical or human monitors within sensitive border regions and extremely intrusive for mobile ground and air inspections carried out with virtually no constraints) but under any circumstance, the use of foreign or foreign neutral personnel in barracks, at airfields, in tank parks, at major crossroads and harbours or along border zones would be quite exceptional. Nevertheless, Inspection Measures clearly seem to be amongst the most effective potential Confidence-Building Measures. After all, what could be more effective at demonstrating benign intent than the granting of permission to potential adversaries to examine your defensive forces to their own satisfaction and allowing them to establish early warning monitors on your territory?

To some extent this must be true but such a view is ultimately predicated on a superficial appreciation of modern military forces and their capabilities as well as on a corresponding overestimation of what any type of Confidence Building can accomplish. First of all, modern military forces possess capabilities that have no obviously offensive or defensive character. Tanks and various other types of armoured

