proportion to the rest of the book as to appear irrelevant to many, is exceedingly interesting. It teaches, for the benefit of young converts from any religious system, that great truths have always lain at the bottom of those religious forms which advancing knowledge finds inadequate and casts aside.

From various passages in the book we gather that Professor Lorimer regards *freedom of the will*, at least between limits, as equally necessary with optimism to render jurisprudence possible. We cannot be sure that we know what he means by 'freedom of the will' (we never can be sure that we know what any one means by this mystic formula), but if he means by it a denial of determinism, then we can only ask, What becomes of your law of nature? Determinism is as necessary to jurisprudence as optimism, or at least meliorism. If an enacted law does not serve as a motive for the guidance of human actions, then what is the use of your law? If we deny determinism, then truly man is a chaotic and not a kosmic being.

The possibility of the science of jurisprudence having been thus settled, the next question discussed is, how does man become cognizant of the rule of life? Professor Lorimer answers that it is the declaration of man's whole normal nature. With this formula we might, using it in a certain sense, agree; but when we come to find out the theory of which it is the expression, we must dissent. According to Professor Lorimer, man was originally perfect; but he fell. Consequently his moral eyesight became dimmed, and he was rendered incapable of seeing and realizing the nature which was in him, and which made him a man. "The law that is within a savage is the self-same law that is within a civilized man, otherwise the savage would not be a man; but the savage does not know—is not *conscious* of the law to the same extent." This theory implies the hypothesis of the special creation of man. On the evolution hypothesis moral advancement does not simply consist in merely clearing away the beclouding mists. Even if the mists were cleared away there would be barrenness beneath. It is only in the harmonization of the inner man with external circumstances that moral advancement consists. This harmonization proceeds by a joint process of growth and decay as the surroundings become more extensive. For instance, the desire for revenge dies out, but there must also be the growth of the positive social feelings. We might almost say that the old feelings are crowded out or buried under the new ones. The ill adaptation of man to his general environment may be called evil in general; the ill adaptation of man to that part of his environment which consists of other men may be called social evil. It is with social evil alone that we have here to do. We may, in one sense, say that man has fallen, inasmuch as he may at one time have been almost completely adapted to the tribal mode of life. We would, however, prefer a fallen man now to a perfect man then; the latter is developed—he is an epitome of a longer line of humanity than the other.

The savage and the civilized man have, however, one feeling in common: this is the desire for self-preservation. This leads us to the third branch of the subject, viz., 'Of the rights and duties which nature reveals.' The first proposition is that '*Nature reveals no rights in relation to the Creator.*' There can be little doubt of this. 'Born into life we are, and life must be our mould.' Man is only now beginning to learn from nature's discipline that his rights are only limited to those which he holds in relation to other beings like himself.

> "Why are men ill at ease? . . . .
> 'Tis that he makes his *will*
> The measure of his *rights*,
> And believes Nature outraged if his will's gainsaid."

'In our relation to creation, animate and inanimate, nature reveals rights.' The first of these is that 'the fact of being involves the right to be.' It might be a matter of some interest and at the same time instructive to attempt to trace the origin of this feeling which we thus consciously formulate. Perhaps originating in the first mute writhing protest of a lower form of existence, it has now become a formula on which the science of jurisprudence is to rest. We have not space to say much of these rights and duties, but we may say that if Professor Lorimer had attempted to account for the feelings of which these formulæ are the expression, he would have been saved from error on one side, while if he had taken them up sooner and carried them out to their consequences, he would have been saved from error on the other side.

There is much in this book which is of value, although it is nearly all expressed in a way from which we must utterly dissent. It is a book which all who take an interest in social questions should read; although they must be careful not to regard it as final. As a work on jurisprudence we may say that there is more to be said for the historical school than has been said here; and a greater use to be made of their materials. It is a rather difficult book on the Arts Course when there is no College affiliated with the University in which lectures are delivered on it. It is a rather one-sided book not to have others, or at least lectures pointing out others, as correctives. We may say that Maine's works and Herbert Spencer's should be taken as counteractives, while the careful study of that sublime hymn from Matthew Arnold's "Empedocles on Ætna" will give much assistance. If we shall succeed in nothing but inducing some to read and study this wonderful intellectual poem we shall have done much.

We have not dwelt on the distinction between social statics and social dynamics. Nor have we emphasized our faith and hope that humanity is gradually approaching a state of equilibrium when his rights, that is, his feelings as to what are his rights, will be harmonized with his powers. It is in this state of equilibrium that there can be liberty without license, and equality in fraternity. This state will be produced by the contact of man with man, and the consequent modification of his feelings. Then the feeling that one nation has a right to aggress on another shall have died out, as the feeling has been gradually dying out that one man has a right to aggress on another.

Professor Lorimer seems to think that the highest good attainable by man will be the gradual approach of enacted law to positive law, that is, that enacted law will more and more adequately declare the natural law. To us it appears that the highest state will be reached when the development of man's nature shall have rendered enacted law unnecessary.

AN ALLEGORY.

> "If we will but listen attentively, we can hear in all religions a groaning of the spirit, a struggle to conceive the inconceivable, to utter the unutterable, a longing after the Infinite."—MAX MULLER.

Once, wearied and uncertain with long study of page on page of dull, repeated thoughts of other men, miscalled historical philosophy, I slept and dreamt . . . . what they were I knew not, whether they even were, I knew not, these myriad troops of shapes—if shapes they might be called; dim, changeful, like evanescent clouds at midnight, ceaselessly struggling. Never resting, never falling. Were they self-impelled, or did some fell and unseen power hurtle them about? I knew not, could not stay to think, hardly daring e'en to think them thinkable. Had they life? If hatred and existence, giving rise to endless strife and turmoil, constituted life, they lived indeed. Yet still to these they added this: they troubled me. Must I ally myself to one against the rest? Why ask? Ah! have they aught with me? Do any emanate from me, unknown? Are they within me or without? Are they myself? Or does that guessed-at, circumfused 'without,' those semi-tangible, supposed gales, in which they seem to hover like to mists, give rise to creatures which now make me doubt? Doubt what? O ask it not. Can I e'en say 'There is?' . . . Then came a deeper sleep. All consciousness of self was lost, and in my place appeared a deep, unfathomable ocean. And yet I thought—or dreamed, that looking on, I thought—this restless, tossing ocean was ourselves, and wearying winds—the only things that we could feel, that we could know—forever tossed us to and fro, and bred those cloudy phantoms that are ourselves yet not ourselves; without us, yet reflected back, till we—partaking their revolving hues, as hurried here and there and blown before each breeze they seemed now dark, now bright—knew not ourselves. The tired ocean sighed for rest. It wanted not these exhalations of itself. What wanted they with it? "Give me but peace, calm, dreamful quiet," it cried. "Show me that noiseless, silent power of whom I oft have heard, that cold, pale goddess with garish eye, that has no resting-place. Were she to pass this way, oh! I would woo her to clasp me with her icy touch; then, then would cease these vapory shadows' and I"—— . . . . I woke and mused upon my dream. Foolish sea, thought I, rest is not happiness. Those shapeless clouds are but thy weak endeavours to reach that glorious sun that shines behind. They hide him yet reflect him, and, perchance, will will one day form his radiant throne. This word 'perchance' I feared and dared not further muse.

T. A. H.

NAMA-WAY-QUA-DONK—THE BAY OF STURGEONS.

Commonly called Colpoy's Bay, an arm of the Georgian Bay. This is a beautiful sheet of water, nine miles long, surrounded by lofty cliffs of limestone crowned by forests, once the haunt of a tribe of Indians called Petons, or "Tobacco Indians."

In the course of time the wave of nations northward engulphed them in its sweep, so that nothing now is left of them save a few relics, and their memory too is almost extinct. On the shores of this bay it is supposed the last great battle was fought, after which only a remnant survived, soon to become scattered and merged in the neighboring tribes.

Medwayosh is an onomatopœtic word of Ojibaway origin, resembling in sound the waves beating or washing on the shore.

> Cold in the autumn night—
> Sweeping with its waters bright,