given *inter alios*, which might be cited as an authority against him in some other suit. Section 154 appears to have been framed for the very purpose of limiting the right of intervention to those persons who can show that a final judgment may possibly be obtained in the suit, which will enable the party who obtains it to possess himself of their estate, or otherwise to impair their legal rights.

Their Lordships are accordingly of opinion that the judgments appealed from ought to be affirmed, and they will humbly advise Her Majesty to that effect. There will be no order as to the costs of any of these appeals.

Appeal dismissed.

THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE.

[Continued from p. 280.]

To the American Bar Association:

Beginning with the first step of the complaining party, his complaint, it should be as simple as possible. Its only office is to apprise the other party of what is charged and demanded against him, and to confine the action of the court to the charge made. The next step is the answer. How much time is it reasonable that a defendant should have for answering a charge? And preliminary to that question is another, that is, where is the answer to be made, for if it must be made in open court, the parties will have to wait for its sitting. But if the answer may be delivered in writing at any time, either by filing it with the clerk or giving it to the party, such a time should be fixed as will, on an average, answer the needs of a defendant, so that there shall be as little occasion as possible for an application to enlarge it. Ten days will answer in most cases; twenty days should answer in all but the most exceptional ones. Oral pleadings are not suited to the habits of our people. The time of the suitor has become too much occupied. Written pleadings, rightly conducted, are in fact labor-saving processes. Convenience, as well as certainty, require that both complaint and answer should be formulated and reduced to writing.

The charge and defence being developed, the State is to intervene and dispose of the controversy. Whatever of delay now occurs is the fault partly of the State and its officers and partly of the contestants. The State has an interest in bringing the contention to an end as speedily as possible for the sake of peace, if there were no other reason. But there are other reasons. The mere presence on the record of an undecided case tends in some degree to interfere with the disposition of the other cases, for it stands in the way, and acts as a menace of intrusion into the order of business. Therefore whenever the court is ready, and the parties without sufficient excuse are not ready, the case should be dismissed from the court.

Supposing however both the parties to be ready, the State should be ready also. This is a duty which the body politic owes to all suitors; a duty which however neglected, is none the less imperative and of universal application. The State should never keep the citizen waiting for justice longer than is necessary to bring the judges to their seats. There are two maxims, a strict adherence to which would go far to wipe away the reproach of the law's delay, one that the State should be ready for the trial when both the parties are ready, and the other that if both are not ready when one of them is, the unready one should be put in default, unless he offers an excuse satisfactory to the court, and conformable to previously defined rules. Make the rules for these excuses precise and inexorable. The parties can of course waive them if they choose. But if insisted upon by either, the court should not be permitted to dispense with them any more than it is permitted to dispense with the period of limitation for an action or an appeal. One of the rules should declare that the absence or engagement of counsel elsewhere is not to be accepted as an excuse. To allow it would be to impose a sacrifice which neither the counsel nor the party in the one suit has a right to expect of either counsel or party in the other. And moreover the interests of the public are opposed to it. Neither should the convenience of a party be an excuse. It is especially his business to be in court, when his adversary is there to confront him. No more should the absence of a witness, unless it be shown that the