

spirit different from this is at work even in Canada. The stream of Christian union is flowing strongly, and we hope that it will deepen and widen till it shall carry on its bosom all who love the Lord Jesus Christ and desire the triumph of His kingdom; but there are counter-currents and eddies here and there, in which chips and straws, put in motion by the main rushing of the waters, are circulating. We can read on them minute inscriptions, "The Church! The Church!" But their motion is as frequently backward as forward; so that we find it difficult to calculate their ultimate destination. It seems almost ludicrous that any denomination of Christians in this disendowed country of Canada, should receive with applause a paper in which four fifths of the Protestants of the Dominion are stigmatized as separatists, while, forsooth, social equality is magnanimously conceded to them. It is a matter of thankfulness that union with other denominations in the common work of the Master, has forced itself upon the attention even of High Churchmen, but complete and successful co-operation can never be attained except on the footing of ecclesiastical as well as social equality.

SUSTENTATION.

MR. EDITOR,—We find ourselves face to face with the question of substituting a proposed sustentation scheme for our present method of supplementing weak congregations. As much has been written and said on the alleged advantages of the one scheme and the other, one would imagine that the changes proposed were radical and sweeping. The following comparison may be of service in shewing exactly what the proposed changes are. It may be surprising to some to find that they amount to so little.

On comparing (not United Presbyterian supplement with Free Church sustentation, but) our present supplemental scheme with the proposed "sustentation," as revised by the committee in charge of the same, we find that they agree in part, and in part they differ.

They agree in the following points.

1. Both aim at securing to our pastors a minimum salary (\$700 and \$750).
2. Both require aid-receiving congregations to contribute towards their pastors' salaries a minimum amount (\$450 and \$500). Aid-receiving congregations failing to do so may be removed from the list.
3. Both forbid aid-receiving congregations to pay their minister a supplement, or in other words, salaries will not be supplemented by the committee beyond the minimum fixed.
4. Both require aid-receiving, and indeed self-sustaining, congregations to send annual financial reports to the committee through the Presbytery.
5. Both allow self-sustaining congregations to regulate their own finances; and contribute what they can to help those in need.

They differ as follows: By our present arrangements aid-receiving congregations pay what they can to their pastors *directly*. By the new plan this amount is *first sent to the central fund* and then sent to the minister. In other words it is proposed to "aim at" a minimum fifty dollars higher than the present one; and, in order to reach this minimum, a change in method is proposed, namely, supplemented congregations shall no longer pay their pastors anything *through their own treasurers, but through the general agent of the Church*. After careful examination we can find no other material difference between the two schemes.

The scheme sent down does not tell us whether the Sustentation and Home Mission Funds are to be kept separate or to remain one as at present (perhaps the Convener would give us light on this point). There is nothing in the trifling change noted above which requires their separation, although the language used would seem to indicate that separation is the Committee's idea.

Having called attention to the real issue before us, this letter might close, but with your permission, Mr. Editor, we offer one or two remarks.

We raise little objection to the provisions of the scheme, but we may ask, why all this ado about so little? Instead of appearing to remit to Presbyteries a grand sustentation scheme, when in fact it is simply our present supplemental scheme in new words and with a mere shred of the sustentation idea in it, why not state at once, "we propose raising the minimum salary to \$750 and a manse; and to secure this we

propose that, hereafter, supplemented congregations pay nothing to their ministers except through the general agent; and that contributions for supplement and Home Mission be kept separate?"

Again, we remark that the scheme sent down is simply *administrative*—regulations under which we are to receive and distribute the liberality of the people; while what we need most is something to *call out* their liberality. Administering \$600 this way or that way will not make it \$750. We require more money, not better schemes for managing it. We hear little complaint as to administration; but much about having little to administer. The problem that needs solution is, *How shall we get more money for sustentation?* and we submit that this point has not been met by the scheme sent down.

We venture to think that if instead of asking the members of the Sustentation Committee to spend time and energy in discussing these regulations, we sent these able and respected brethren through the length and breadth of the land to rouse the people to larger giving to the cause of Christ, God would own their efforts, and before long we would find the treasury of the Lord full to overflowing, and our present schemes of administration working fairly well.

Spencerville, Jan., 1881.

W. J. DEY.

THE MARRIAGE QUESTION.

MR. EDITOR,—The reply of Mr. Blair to my last letter, full and kindly expressed as it is, gives me much satisfaction. His recommendation, that I should study the subject, I also appreciate, although I venture to assure him that it was hardly needed, for it was only very full examination that led me to give up the views which he still holds, when I found them utterly indefensible. Of course each of us will naturally suppose that the other wants *our* light, and we must thus agree to differ.

Alike from Mr. Blair's letter and from the very kind note of Mr. Wilkins, it is evident that the one point of difference is coming clearly out. Mr. Blair asks, "How are we to decide the question if the *argument from analogy* be disallowed?" thus admitting that, without that mode of reasoning, his position cannot be vindicated. And Mr. Wilkins says Mr. Laing "has already admitted that *if the analogue be granted* its correlate must follow;" thus both admit that the conclusion which I impugn rests on an analogical inference from Lev. xviii. 16, as its major premise. The *legitimacy* of this premise is the point at issue. If it can be vindicated, they are right; if it cannot be vindicated, their conclusion is wrong.

Mr. Blair admits that his argument is based on this *assumption*, but meets my objection by saying that I also "assume what the Scripture nowhere asserts, viz., that there is a difference between (a wife's) relatives by blood in the collateral line and (her) relatives in the direct line," and he asks me to shew proof, adding that his assumption is as good as mine. Now, although the *onus probandi* properly lies with Mr. Blair, who asserts that the relations are *pro tanto* the same, and his demand that I should shew the difference, is requiring me to prove a negative, still I will try to shew that Scripture, in Lev. xviii., recognizes this difference, so that my position is not a *mere* assumption, but has a firm basis in the law itself.

Dr. Lindsay, in his Inquiry, page 76, although holding the commonly received view of this question, says: "Those who hold that consanguinity and affinity constitute equal obstacles to marriage, do not set out from this as a *first principle*, nor do they even conceive it to be *obviously implied* in verse 6, but they reach it as a *deduction* at the end of their inquiry, in consequence of finding that the prohibitions laid down refer *de facto* just as frequently to affinity as to consanguinity, and mark out the one to just as remote limits as the other. It is a *deduction from the series of particular cases adduced* as examples by Moses; and the fact that a grand-daughter and a wife's grand-daughter are both specified, is one of the proofs of the conclusion so drawn." I regard this as a good statement of the method to be pursued in this inquiry, and ask your readers to note the phrases in italics. No first principle is to be *assumed*; nor is the proposition that consanguinity and affinity are equivalent to be taken as *implied* in the phrase, "near of kin;" it is to be *shewn* to be a *legitimate deduction* from a series of particular cases. Let us then analyze Lev. xviii. 6 to 18, and ascertain what the series is. Verse 6 gives the principle, "Nearness of kin is a barrier to mar-

riage." Who then are included in that phrase? Who are near of kin to a man for the purposes of this statute? We find the answer in verses 7 to 18, viz.:

1. A man's own blood relatives (vers. 7, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13).

2. Women married to a man's blood relatives (vers. 8, 14, 15, 15).

3. The blood relatives of the wife, (1) ver. 17, in the direct line, (2) ver. 18, in the collateral line *during the wife's lifetime*.

Such is the "series of particular cases adduced" by Moses. Now, that series does not include the wife's relatives in the collateral line, except as specified in verse 18, and there the prohibition is *expressly limited* to the wife's lifetime. Seeing then that a *deceased* wife's sister is not in the "series," how can a deduction from the series legitimately include that relation? Impossible. Some other argument is required, so that the relation may be included in a proposition which is not a legitimate deduction from that series. The thing needed is just the *analogical assumption* to which I object. Well, does Mr. Blair ask how we can proceed with his argument if this is disallowed. We cannot. And here let me refer to Mr. Wilkins' "*non sequitur*." I strongly hold Dr. Hodge's view. Of a truth, ver. 18 does not say that the marriage is a proper one. It forbids marriage with a wife's sister when the wife is living, but does not say anything about the matter after she is dead; but, "where there is no law there is no sin," and what is not forbidden is lawful. So, unless ver. 16 or some other portion of Scripture contains a prohibition, the marriage in question is lawful. This I admit. Further, it may fairly be urged, that so far as ver. 18 is concerned, the fact that it contains a *limited* prohibition implies the repeal of that prohibition when the limit is removed, i.e., that after the wife's death the prohibition ceases and the man is free. Looking then at the law *de facto*, as Dr. Lindsay terms it, am I not justified in holding (1) A man may marry any woman not forbidden by Lev. xviii. (2) That Scripture forbids marriage with certain women who are near of kin. (3) It also contains a series of particular cases shewing who are near of kin. (4) Marriage with those thus specified is forbidden. (5) A wife's sister is specified during the wife's life, and is therefore *during that time* forbidden. (6) A wife's sister after the wife's death is not specified. (7) Therefore a deceased wife's sister is not prohibited, and marriage with her is not a breach of the law. Further, is it not evident that Scripture does make a difference between the blood relatives of a wife in the direct and collateral lines, forbidding the first (ver. 17) permanently, but the second (ver. 18) only "in her lifetime." The difference is there, and I have shewn it, so that my position is not like Mr. Blair's, a mere assumption, but a well-founded statement of what is expressly stated in the law.

Mr. Blair is justified in his strictures in paragraph 5th of his letter. He had not probably seen the correction which I sent you when he wrote, or doubtless he would have modified his reply. Your readers, however, have all intelligence enough to see that however justly my mistake reflects on me personally, it does not in the slightest degree affect the argument.

Now, Mr. Editor, whatever may be the final settlement of this question when it has to be dealt with by the supreme Court, it cannot fail to be of advantage that the subject has been discussed in a fair way and brotherly spirit. Great is the truth and will prevail. I am liable to error, and ask no one to go further than he has light, but I trust others will give brethren credit for honesty, some little common sense, and even a little logic, although they and their opponents differ in their conclusions, seeing that they are not agreed as to the premises.

Dundas, Ont., January 8th, 1881.

JOHN LAING.

PHILALETHES AND PRINCIPAL GRANT.

MR. EDITOR,—I said in my former communication that a sense of honour would prevent Principal Grant from accepting the weapon offered by "A Lover of Truth" for his defence. I have two more things to say about that weapon. The first is that a sense of truth as well as honour, will prevent Principal Grant from accepting it. Principal Grant knows that I faithfully represented his position at the Council. To say that Principal Grant said substantially that "a minister as long as he believed himself faithful to Him to whom he took his ordination vows, should not