

markable. In any case it is quite incredible—but for the fact that we have done it; and the end is not yet, may be in fact only beginning.

To get that army of 200,000—mainly civilians—into khaki and under arms meant a huge expenditure of money. An emergency session of Parliament on August 18th, 1914, voted a war credit of \$50,000,000. That was only the beginning. At the last regular session of Parliament the war loan was increased to \$150,000,000. And that is by no means the end.

THE COST OF OUR ARMY.

WHAT that Canadian army is really costing and will cost the country can be estimated. By government methods of purchasing supplies, in vogue up till half our present army had been mobilized, it cost on an average not less than \$1,000 to put every man into the field and to pay his wages of a dollar a day for one year. With an army of 200,000 as far as possible under arms and fully equipped this means a cost of \$200,000,000. Reorganized purchasing machinery has since lowered the average cost. But the aggregate cost of our army of anywhere under 300,000 men runs into hundreds of millions of actual outlay to get men into the field and to pay their wages on service. That, again, twelve months ago, would have been incredible.

But that is not all of the army cost. Every man taken from civilian life and into the army is a man taken from some form of productive employment and diverted to the business of consuming food, clothing and munitions on works of absolute destruction. If the average economic value of an English soldier, as estimated by Mr. Arthur Balfour, is \$600 a year, at Canadian rate of wages the average economic value of a Canadian soldier at peace industry is nearer \$1,000. The economic value of a Canadian army of 200,000 men is therefore not less than \$175,000,000 a year. Therefore, the total cost of our army abroad, quite independent of the food and the munitions they consume—which are paid for by Great Britain—means not less than \$375,000,000 a year. And that item of arithmetic if put before the average Canadian twelve months ago would have staggered the imagination.

In order to pay the interest on the war loans necessary to cover this mammoth expenditure, the people of Canada have been submitted to various forms of war taxes, both federal and provincial. No tax was ever less unpopular.

Corporate and more or less organized benevolence was in the field long before our first contingent landed in England. Every province made a separate gift of various kinds of foodstuffs and the Canadian Government donated one million bags of flour. A general Patriotic Fund was organized to take care of the families of Canadian soldiers. This fund raised a million dollars in a few weeks. It has since multiplied the amount to several millions, and for the coming year it is estimated that the Patriotic Fund will need to be fed to the extent of \$9,000,000.

The Red Cross Fund has been organized with local units in almost every town and village in Canada. That also has raised millions. The recent campaign culminating in Trafalgar Day netted the Fund \$1,500,000 from Ontario alone.

ORGANIZING BENEVOLENCE.

MANY other funds have been maintained and are still being maintained by numerous societies. Churches, lodges, clubs, municipalities, societies of one sort or another, have all levied tribute upon their respective sections of the public for war benevolences. We have never yet heard the song, "Pay, Pay, Pay!" in this war. The public have paid and are still paying and expect to go on paying cheerfully without theatrical incitements to do their duty. Canadians discovered almost suddenly that the aggregate of money capable of being dug up from the pockets of the people for benevolent purposes was no small amount. What people had been in the habit of handing out for extra benevolences to themselves in the form of luxuries, they found it quite as easy, and much more inspiring to hand out for to get comforts for other people elsewhere.

Before our first contingent landed at Plymouth, Canada began to organize a movement intended, as far as possible, to keep "business as usual," which was the slogan of the British public for months after the war began, but has since changed to something else. The made-in-Canada campaign was launched


in the newspapers by the Canadian Manufacturers' Association. The campaign was expected to convince Canadians that money spent for goods made by Canadians was a form of national economy that would turn an era of trade depression into a time of prosperity. The movement was somewhat sentimental, but its basic economy was sound and its results beneficial. If Canadians could not be induced by a mere patriotic appeal to buy Canadian goods, they could be persuaded on the grounds of national prosperity. And to a great extent they were acted on from both motives.

Similar in idea and even more spectacular in its appeal was the Patriotism and Production campaign, inaugurated by the Department of Agriculture at Ottawa and supported by provincial departments of agriculture and farmers' associations all over the country. As Minister of Finance, Tom White pointed out not long ago in Toronto, Canadians found that it was possible both to economize and to increase production. Everybody economized. Everybody as far as possible increased production. How this P. and P. movement got hold of people even in cities and towns was well illustrated by the back-to-the-land movement in centres of population. In Toronto alone several hundreds of acres of vacant lots were turned into vegetable gardens. What the townspeople did in little the farmers by a more or less concerted effort did in large. Especially in the West the acreage under crop was increased by a large percentage. Those who did not increase acreage intensified cultivation. From both sources, aided by a season of unusually good weather, the total aggregate of wheat in the western provinces mounted by the most recent estimates to 300,000,000 bushels, which is about 90,000,000 bushels more than the highest yield on record before 1915.

NATIONAL SELF-HELP.

AND even this one item alone if predicted twelve months ago would have been relegated to the Tales of the Arabian Nights. It was found that under stress of necessity and a high form of self-interest, people at large could co-ordinate their own efforts into increased production. National self-
(Concluded on page 18.)


THE LIGHT MONOPLANE, SCOUT AND DESTROYER



The one-engine, one-man monoplane of Vedrines, the noted French aviator, ready to go up at a maximum of speed.

WAR aeroplanes are of two general kinds; the light, speedy craft that carries a very small load, travels at high speed and is used mainly for scouting and swift pursuit of enemy craft; and the heavier, more powerful machine that may be propelled by two engines, carries at least two men and a cargo of explosives running into hundreds of pounds. There is the same difference between these two general types of machine as between a battle cruiser and a submarine chaser. Both are highly necessary in this war. For the main use of aircraft in conjunction with troops the lighter machine is probably more effective. The aircraft is constantly engaged in scouting and observation work; that is its regular function in the war. It is more rarely but quite as effectively used for bombardments from the air, either upon enemy craft such as Zeppelins or upon fortified land positions, or any other object it may be necessary to destroy with high explosives.

The general tendency among British and French air-men is to encourage



Vedrines getting ready his machine-gun for use against enemy craft.

the lighter type of machine as being more mobile and easier to manipulate for a given purpose in a specified time. The one-engine monoplane, such as the splendid French aircraft shown on this page, carries but one man, who must be his own pilot, driver and gunner. His chief weapon is a machine-gun, which is shown ready for action in front of him pointing directly out past the propeller. With this he may do deadly work on enemy aircraft of less size than a Zeppelin and might even damage a Zeppelin at short range. The air-man may carry, also, a small supply of small bombs which may be discharged by a lever operated like the levers of a motor-car. But for most of his time the bird-man in a light scouting monoplane is concerned in observation work. If he is surprised by enemy craft he usually has no trouble getting away at high speed. He is not dependent upon weather conditions as the giant aircraft are. He is the scout of the air-fleet, sometimes the destroyer. The light monoplane is on an average more useful than the heavy biplane.