

whose moral character no breath has ever been whispered, who has trained his intellect with all the power of his nature, and acquired all the knowledge within his reach, and devoted both his intellect and knowledge to the administration of justice, with the one intent that it shall flow pure, free and strong from the fountains of an ancient and uncorrupted jurisprudence; who always regarded the judicial office as a public trust, his official time the public time, his deliverances from the judgment-seat as utterances for which he must account here and hereafter; who has regulated his judicial conduct and demeanor by the consciousness that he sets an example to all mankind; who has not cringed to the influential, nor sneered at nor oppressed the weak; and who, in the days of technical subtlety, aimed to make law the embodiment of justice and common sense—when all this can be said of a man, shall it be denied that he was a great judge? Yes, it might be. It is necessary to add that his grasp of legal principles was only equalled by his mastery of fact, and that for both he was distinguished. And we thus complete the portrait of Lord Bramwell, both a great and a good judge. We agree with some biographers that Lord Bramwell found the greatest scope for his great gifts when presiding at Nisi Prius. He had a keen insight into human nature; he knew its weakness, its foibles and its faults. Humbug had no chance before him. Sharp practice to him was almost a criminal offence. He did what few judges succeed in doing—he put before juries his view of a case without appearing to take a side, and we think most judges fail to realize how largely this qualification is necessary to make the public satisfied with trial by jury. Further, we conceive that Lord Justice Bramwell, presiding over the Court of Appeal shone almost as much as Baron Bramwell at Nisi Prius. He used to sit with Lord Justice Brett (Lord Esher) on one side, and Lord Justice Mellish on the other. He supplemented the somewhat academic narrowness of the latter, and restrained the impetuosity of the former, thus constituting the court an almost ideal tribunal. And practising before him came such men as Edward James, Holker, Benjamin and Herschell. His one partiality, if so it may be called, was supposed to consist of a leaning in favor of railway companies. He believed them to be largely victimized. And so they are. But it was felt that they had a better chance before Baron Bramwell than before other judges, which sentiment we are sure he would have been the first to deprecate. It would have been well, we think, had his retire-