

recent and prospective developments in the secret negotiations which have been proceeding between the United States and Japan. I am also attaching a draft telegram which could be sent to the United Kingdom Government if you approve endorsing the United Kingdom Government's doubts about the reliability of Japanese promises of future good behaviour.

N. A. R[OBERTSON]

[PIÈCE JOINTE 1/ENCLOSURE 1]

*Mémorandum du sous-secrétaire d'État adjoint aux Affaires extérieures¹
au Premier ministre*

*Memorandum from Assistant Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs¹
to Prime Minister*

SECRET

[Ottawa,] September 24, 1941

D.O. TELEGRAM M.310—JAPAN

1. In my opinion London's reply to Sir Robert Craigie is most reasonable and appropriate. Mr. Grew's suggestion that the "highest authorities" in the United States and Great Britain should refer publicly to "the advantages which Japan may expect to derive from loosening her present close ties with the Axis and abandoning her policy of economic exclusionism in the Far East" would, if carried out, probably do no great harm; but to carry this policy to the point of promising economic benefits without demanding some very concrete *proof* of the abandonment of recent Japanese policies would be to fall again into the old, time-worn and very obvious Japanese trap.

2. Throughout the early years of renewed Japanese aggression (1931-1935) Japanese official and unofficial representatives abroad, at the instigation of their Government, argued over and over again: "Just leave us alone, avoid all evidence of outside pressure, and sooner or later our liberal elements will regain control from the extremists and then we can resume policies of international cooperation". By accepting this argument Britain and America were hamstrung for years, during which time the Japanese, laughing heartily up their kimono sleeves, went on from aggression to aggression. Now this booby-trap is being tried again.

3. It is probably true that the Japanese are beginning to fear that they picked the wrong side, and that they do not like the manners of the German army of occupation in Tokyo. And it is natural that they should try to persuade Britain and America to pay them for deserting their present allies.

¹ H. L. Keenleyside.